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Abstract	  
This study investigates the effect of institutions on the unemployment-duration gap between non-
EU immigrants and natives in 12 European countries. Further than the existing literature, we study 
unemployment duration distinguishing between exits to inactivity, primary and secondary 
employment. Additionally, we provide a stronger micro-foundation to the comparative literature by 
introducing institutional measures for unemployment-related benefits at the individual level rather 
than merely using aggregate proxies. Our analysis finds no disincentive effects of benefits for 
immigrants. Furthermore, the employment prospects of immigrants are better when the demand for 
low-skilled labour is high and immigration policy is labour market oriented. In contrast, 
employment protection legislation does not affect the unemployment duration of immigrants.  
 
Keywords: immigrants, unemployment duration, welfare- and labour market institutions and 
structures 
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1. Introduction	  
During the last decades, Western Europe has become the destination for immigrants originating 
from all over the world. In most countries the labour market integration of these immigrants has 
proven problematic. A crucial indicator of the poor labour market integration is their relatively high 
unemployment rates that, at times, more than double that of native rates (OECD, 2008; see also 
Table 2 below). This large unemployment gap has caused political and public concern as it is 
assumed to challenge social cohesion and to undermine the sustainability of welfare states (Bask, 
2005; Bergmark and Backman, 2004; Zimmermann, 1995). In some countries, benefits have also 
been accused of creating welfare dependency particularly for immigrants (Corrigan, 2010).   
However, the immigrant-native unemployment gap varies across countries, largely 
following the pattern of the different types of welfare state. In particular, immigrants appear to have 
major difficulties in gaining a foothold on the Scandinavia and some Continental European labour 
markets whilst integration is less problematic in the rest of Europe, especially in the Anglo-Saxon 
and Southern European countries (OECD, 2008; see also Table 2 below).1 An emerging body of 
comparative research tries to explain this by suggesting that: “... immigration policy, labour market 
structure and regulations, and welfare regimes influence the basic mechanism of labour market 
allocation – that is, how these structural components shape employers’ and job seekers’ resources 
and preferences, which determine the way individuals are matched with jobs” (Kogan, 2007: 183; 
for a theoretical overview see also Reitz, 1998).  
Existing comparative studies on the nativity unemployment gap are scarce and typically rely 
on a single measure, either the unemployment rate at the macro level or unemployment incidence at 
the individual level. However, unemployment persistence or duration has rarely been used in the 
cross-country comparative literature (only Kogan (2004a) measures unemployment duration with 
monthly precession). It is more interesting to know how host country institutions or structures 
influence unemployment duration as long-term unemployment poses a greater threat to the labour 
market integration of immigrants than high incidence of unemployment because it is often 
associated with skills depreciation, worker discouragement and ultimately with stigma. 
Furthermore, information about unemployment duration or transitions provides insights to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It should be noted that the integration of immigrants in Scandinavia has improved during recent years possibly due to 
different types of integration measures. 
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mechanisms behind the large unemployment gap between immigrants and natives. Such precise 
information is crucial for policy makers who aim to improve the labour market integration of 
immigrants. Moreover, most studies ignore the fact that because immigrants are predominantly 
employed in low-skilled jobs, their inferior labour market integration may apply more to the quality 
of jobs than to their aggregate job-finding probability (Kogan, 2007). Transitions from 
unemployment to inactivity have also been neglected. Immigrants may be more affected by the 
‘discouraged worker problem’ than natives, as they may simply stop searching for a job because of 
repeated refusals. This would lead to higher rates of ‘hidden’ unemployment for immigrants. 
Finally, previous research mainly relies on macro-level indicators when investigating institutional 
effects. The effect of economic incentives is typically measured by including welfare regime 
dummies (e.g. Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010; Kogan, 2006), by comparing countries belonging 
to different types of welfare states (e.g. Kesler, 2006) or by an index for the generosity and duration 
of unemployment benefits (e.g. Reyneri and Fullin, 2011). This may be particularly problematic 
because a vast economic literature shows that disincentive effects of unemployment benefits are 
determined at the individual level and not at the country level (Mortensen, 1977; Holmlund, 1998). 
Moreover, these indexes are constructed to capture the aspects of welfare state policies for natives 
and therefore do not necessarily apply to immigrants. For this reason, even though this strand of 
research provides valuable nuances to the cross-national debate about the labour market integration 
of immigrants, its micro-foundation is somewhat less developed.  
The aim of this study is to investigate the influence of host country features – 
unemployment benefits, immigration policy, employment protection legislation (EPL) and 
employment structure – on difference in unemployment duration between non-EU immigrants and 
natives in 12 European countries. In particular, we contrast two theoretical explanations about the 
effect of benefits. The first is an explanation that builds on the comparative theoretical framework 
and predicts that unemployment benefits create disincentives for immigrant employment (Kesler, 
2006; Kogan, 2006; 2007). The second explanation suggests that there are no disincentive effects 
specific to immigrants and that access to benefits can even improve their labour market integration 
(see further discussion in section 2). Concerning the other three institutions/structures, we follow 
the theoretical approach of previous studies (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010; Kesler, 2006; 
Kogan, 2007; Reyneri and Fullin, 2011). More specifically, we expect that immigrants suffer from 
more persistent unemployment when the demand for low-skilled labour is low, the EPL is strict and 
5	  
	  
when the immigration policy has a humanitarian focus. Our analysis therefore extends the existing 
literature in three ways. Firstly, we provide a stronger micro-foundation to the comparative 
literature by introducing institutional measures for unemployment-related benefits at individual 
level rather than merely using aggregate proxies. Secondly, we focus on unemployment duration 
and not on unemployment incidence. Thirdly, we distinguish between transitions from 
unemployment into inactivity, the primary and secondary labour markets. The method we apply is a 
competing-risk event-history model using monthly data from the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP).   
The outline of the study is the following. Section 2 provides a review of the literature. The 
data and methodology are discussed in section 3. The results are presented in section 4. This section 
contain some descriptive figures where we contrast differences in the unemployment rates and 
average unemployment duration between immigrants and natives as well as the relationship 
between the nativity duration gap and our four institutional/structural variables. These descriptive 
statistics are followed by the results from the competing-risks event-history model. Section 5 
presents the conclusions and recommendations for policy and future research. 
 
2. Host	  country	  characteristics	  and	  immigrant	  unemployment	  	  
2.1	  Unemployment	  benefits:	  disincentives	  effects	  or	  efficiency	  gains	  for	  immigrants?	  
From job search theory and a vast empirical literature, we know that benefits increase 
unemployment duration (Mortensen, 1977; Chetty, 2008; for an overview see Holmlund, 1998). In 
greater detail, benefits reduce search intensity and increase the reservation wage of the unemployed, 
which in turn makes them inclined to prolong their unemployment spell (Mortensen, 1977). 
According to Chetty (2008), this negative or moral hazard effect of benefits is larger for 
economically constrained individuals.   
The comparative literature implicitly builds on this line of thought, but inflates it to macro-
level and combines with the theory of welfare regimes put forward by Esping-Andersen (1990) 
(Kogan, 2006; 2007; Kesler, 2006). One of the major contributors is Kogan (2007) who suggests 
that the unemployment gap between immigrants and natives is smaller in countries where the 
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welfare system is meagre or discriminates against the foreign born (the Anglo-Saxon and Southern 
European welfare states). This is because the immigrants’ initial labour market disadvantages 
(related to discrimination, lack of network, country specific human capital and knowledge about the 
labour market etc.) are likely to be offset by their relatively stronger work incentives in these 
countries or a lower reservation wage to use the terminology of job search theory (see also 
Mortensen, 1977).2 In contrast, the unemployment gap is larger in the Scandinavian countries 
because their open and generous welfare states allow immigrants to sustain job search longer. 
According to Kogan (2007), immigrants are therefore also less likely to be pushed into the 
secondary labour market in Scandinavia, but can wait for a good job in the primary labour market 
(Kogan, 2006; 2007; Kesler, 2006). Following this idea, but applying it to individual level 
mechanisms rather than country level aggregates, immigrants who receive generous benefits should 
have an even lower chance than natives to receive a wage offer that exceeds their reservation wage. 
This is may be particularly relevant when we know that immigrants are more likely than natives to 
experience liquidity-constrains (e.g. Bauer, 2011). As a result and in line with the economic and 
comparative literature, (generous) benefits will delay transitions to employment more for 
immigrants than for natives (Hypothesis 1).  
Nevertheless, benefits can also produce certain efficiency gains. From this perspective, 
unemployment related allowances first of all provide financial resources and hence create 
incentives to continue active job search (see e.g. Addison and Portugal, 2003; Rosholm and Vejlin, 
2010). Secondly, providing financial resources to the unemployed may also indirectly improve their 
personal resources by (partly) preventing the decline in psychological wellbeing observed during 
unemployment (Ervasti and Venetoklis, 2010; Fryer, 1986; Goul Andersen, 2002; Leana and 
Feldman, 1990; Nordenmark et al., 2006; Whelan, 1992). This is crucial, when we know that 
psychological well-being is an important determinant for job search behaviour and subsequent 
employment outcomes (e.g. Meyers and Houssemand, 2010; Kanfer et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
welfare states that provide generous unemployment benefits are also more inclined to grant extra 
support (and monitoring) from public employment agents. Support in terms of job search assistance 
and contacts with employers increase the job offer arrival rate and transition to employment 
(Fougere et al., 2009; Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006). All in all, because immigrants on 
average face more severe employment barriers, these efficiency gains or ‘resource effects’ are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The reservation wage refers to the lowest wage offer than unemployed will accept.   
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according to this alternative perspective likely to be stronger for immigrants than for natives and 
counterbalance or neutralise the negative effects expected in Hypothesis 1. Consequently, the 
impact of unemployment related benefits on transitions to employment (both primary and 
secondary) would be similar for immigrants and natives. Furthermore, if immigrants are more likely 
to become discouraged than natives due to the abovementioned disadvantages, the resources from 
benefits may be relatively more important for preventing that immigrants exit to inactivity 
(Hypothesis 2). 
 
2.2	  Labour	  market	  institutions	  and	  structures	  
Labour market institutions and structures are also likely to affect the unemployment-duration gap 
between immigrants and natives (e.g. Cohen and Kogan, 2007; Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010; 
Kogan, 2006). The EPL affects the employers’ hiring and firing costs and thus the wage offer 
distribution.3 Arguably, strict EPL makes employers screen job applicants more carefully in order to 
spot potential low-productive workers (Gangl, 2003; Giesecke and Groß, 2003; Kogan, 2007). In 
the absence of perfect information on worker productivity, employers may give preference to 
applicants from groups that are assumed to have a high average productivity. Using observed 
characteristics as proxies for productivity, employers apply ‘statistical discrimination’ against 
several groups such as females, young people and immigrants (Kogan, 2006; Phelps, 1972). This 
may increase their unemployment duration. In contrast, employers in flexible labour markets are 
assumed to be more prone to use a ‘trial and error’ strategy as a screening device (Giesecke and 
Groß, 2003). Therefore, immigrants should have more employment opportunities in flexible labour 
markets. However, strict EPL may also account for the higher ethnic occupational segregation in 
some countries (Kogan, 2007). If the EPL is strict, immigrants may increasingly be ‘pushed’ into 
the secondary labour market where the regulation tends to be more flexible than in the primary – 
even in otherwise strictly regulated labour markets (Kogan, 2007). Consequently, we therefore 
expect that strict EPL leads to longer unemployment duration for immigrants (especially when 
making the transition into the primary labour market) and increases transitions into inactivity 
(Hypothesis 3). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Here, we use the terminology of job search theory. This refers to the distribution of wages that are ‘offered’ to the 
unemployed. 
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Additionally, as there is less native competition and lower appreciation of human capital in the 
secondary labour market, immigrants should have better job opportunities in this sector (Piore, 
1986; Kogan; 2007). The acceptance of poor jobs by immigrants is believed to be due to their 
ignorance about the host-country’s labour market, their expectation of a temporary stay in Europe 
(Bonacich, 1972; Kogan 2004b; Piore, 1986) and the even poorer job quality in their country of 
origin (Piore, 1986). Consequently, previous research confirms that immigrants find jobs easier in 
labour markets with a high demand for low skilled labour (Kogan, 2006; Reyneri and Fullin, 2011). 
In line with this, we therefore anticipate that transitions to the secondary sector will increase with 
the demand for low-skilled labour (Hypothesis 4). 
 
2.3	  Immigration	  policy	  	  
Finally, immigration policy is also likely to affect the labour market integration of immigrants 
(Kogan, 2003; Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003). Asylum seekers and refugees are generally among the 
groups that experience the greatest difficulties in the labour market. This may be explained by the 
existence of mental and physical problems (see e.g. Kivling-Boden and Sundbom, 2001), but also 
the fact that many come from countries where transferability of human capital to a European 
context is more difficult. Following this line of reasoning, if immigration policy is strict and 
tailored to meet labour market needs, immigrants are easier to integrate. However, if immigration 
policy is strongly affected by humanitarian considerations giving preference to refugees and asylum 
seekers, the labour market integration of immigrants is expected to be poorer (see Kogan, 2007; 
Borjas, 1987; Chiswick, 1999). Consequently, we foresee that the more the immigration policy is 
influenced by humanitarian considerations, the longer is the unemployment duration of immigrants 
compared to the natives and the more likely they are to leave the labour force (Hypothesis 5). 
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3. Data	  and	  methodology	  
3.1	  Data	  
In this study, we use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), a high-quality 
standardized longitudinal household survey conducted in 15 European countries (EUROSTAT, 
2003). The ECHP consists of 8 waves covering the years 1994-2001. The data provides extensive 
information on labour market status, job and demographic characteristics and offers retrospective 
monthly information for every year prior to the survey. This means that we have longitudinal 
information for 96 months. The latter feature makes ECHP particularly suitable for event-history 
analysis (see e.g. Tatsiramos, 2009).4 
The analysis focuses on unemployed individuals from 18 to 65 years. Only 12 of the 15 ECHP 
countries are used in our analysis, as we had to exclude Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden due to 
data limitations. In greater detail, following the principle of Pichler (2011), we left out Ireland due 
to a small immigrant sample. The Netherlands and Sweden were excluded because monthly 
employment information was unavailable. After deleting these countries, our sample includes 
36.810 unemployment spells of which 1.458 refer to non-EU immigrants from non-Western 
countries.5  
The definition of immigrant status is based on region of birth (Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, 
and South America) rather than on citizenship.6 This definition is more comparable across countries 
since citizenship legislation differs considerably between European countries. We would have 
preferred an even more detailed distinction according to the country of birth as we acknowledge 
that characteristics of the country of origin and the conditions of migration are relevant for 
determining the immigrants’ labour market outcomes (e.g. Van Tubergen et al., 2004); however, 
this information is unavailable.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Other studies on the outcomes of immigrants in Europe have also used the ECHP (e.g. Adsera and Chiswick, 2007; 
Buchel and Frick, 2005; Williams, 2011). 
5 These unemployment spells refer to 21.325 individuals of whom 979 are non-EU immigrants. Sensitivity analysis 
indicates that the results are neither sensitive to the inclusion of countries with relatively small immigrant samples nor 
are they driven by the countries with the largest immigrant samples (results are available on request).   
6 For 9 countries we use the variable pm007c or pm007b that distinguishes between being born in the country of 
residence, or in different regions of the world. In case this information was unavailable (either if it was missing or in the 
case of Germany, Luxembourg and Greece), immigrant status was reported ‘Unknown’. 
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The variable referring to unemployment benefits is central to our analysis. We construct a 
time-varying variable indicating the monthly amount of unemployment benefits. As ECHP does not 
provide direct information about monthly amounts, we derive this information from the yearly 
amount of unemployment benefits, the number of months in unemployment and from whether the 
individual receives unemployment benefits at interview time. We further define the replacement 
rate as the monthly amount of unemployment benefits relative to the monthly salary in the last job. 
In order to account for benefit duration, we include a variable indicating whether the individual is 
close to benefit exhaustion using the benefit-generosity index of Scruggs and Alan (2006).  
Following Kogan (2006; 2007), Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010), and Reyneri and Fullin 
(2011) we also use three macro variables. First, the EPL index (time varying) is based on the level 
of hiring and firing regulations and the easiness of using temporary contracts (OECD, 2004). 
Second, the size of the secondary labour market is a self-constructed time-varying variable 
measuring the percentage of workers employed in this sector according to the ISEI occupational 
scale (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996). The secondary sector includes the unskilled, semi-skilled 
and low-skilled occupations that are assigned the scores 16 to 33 on the ISEI-scale (further 
discussion see Kogan, 2007). Third, we use the percentage of asylum seekers in relation to the total 
population of incoming non-EU migrants as a time-varying macro-level proxy for the focus of 
immigration policy (see Kogan, 2007: 30; EUROSTAT, 2000).7 No other more precise indicator is 
available for the relevant time period.  
The list of control variables includes measures for human capital, equivalent household 
income, demographic characteristics, the sequence of the unemployment spell, regional 
unemployment rates, country- and year-dummies. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
main control variables separately for immigrants and natives for the first and sixth unemployment 
month. According to these statistics, most migrants originate from Eastern Europe and Africa and 
are on average a few years older than the natives. The immigrants are more likely than natives to 
have children below the age of 12 and to be married. It is also interesting to note that unemployed 
immigrants on average have a higher educational level, but unlike natives, it is not the most highly 
educated immigrants that exit unemployment first.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This variable is included in the model as a categorical variable (ranging from less than 20% to more than 40%) as this 
specification demonstrated the best model fit measures. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics at different time points of the unemployment spell* 
 Natives (month 1) 
Non-EU imm.  
(month 1) 
Natives (month 6) Non-EU imm. 
(month 6) 
Eastern Europe (%) … 25,1 … 19,4 
Africa (%) … 23,6 … 24,1 
Asia (%) … 7,1 … 8,4 
South America (%) … 8,0 … 8,6 
Country of origin unknown 
(%) 
… 36,2 … 39,5 
Average age 33,2 35,7* 33,7 36,8* 
Female (%) 51,2 50,0 53,5 50,0 
Children<12 years (%) 31,8 42,0* 31,7 39,9* 
Married (%) 43,1 64,2* 36,8 63,2* 
Low educational level (%) 50,2 41,0* 53,5 41,2* 
Medium educational level 
(%) 
34,0 36,7 33,4 36,5 
High educational level (%) 15,8 22,4* 13,1 22,3* 
Average equiv. household 
income 
10 543,6 10 905,5 9 643,5 9 987,9 
Total  36 810 1 458 18 744 834 
* Significant differences between immigrants and natives at a 5 % level.  
 
3.2	  Methodology	  
We employ an event-history model distinguishing between three competing risks: inactivity, 
primary and secondary labour market. The distinction between the primary and secondary labour 
market follows the definition that was explained above. After organising our data in a person-month 
file, we apply a discrete-time event-history model by estimating a multinomial logit regression 
(Allison, 1982). In this model, the dependent variable is the conditional probability that an 
individual  makes the transition into state  in time point conditional that (s)he has remained 
unemployed until time point . This conditional probability depends on a function of 
unemployment duration  – duration dependence – and on several institutional and demographic 
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characteristics. We also include fixed effects for the countries of reference. After testing several 
functions for duration dependence (piecewise constant, linear, log linear, curvelinear functions) by 
comparing the model fit measures (AIC and BIC), we use the logarithmic specification that 
performed best. To correct for possible bias in duration dependence as well as for possible 
correlation between the competing risks we control for unobserved heterogeneity using a parametric 
approach (Vermunt, 2002). Our choice on the functional form of unobserved heterogeneity is based 
on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and in the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
(Agresti, 2002).  The conditional transition probability for an individual  to a competing risk  
conditional of remaining  months in unemployment and of a vector of observed characteristics  
can be expressed as: 
 
where  represents the unobserved individual fixed effects assumed to be independent of observed 
characteristics, but varying with destination states . We further assume that   follows a standard 
normal distribution. 
We allow for multiple unemployment spells per individual and include fixed effects to 
account for differences between them. By accounting for random individual effects, we also correct 
for the possible correlation between these spells that is introduced by spell-constant unobserved 
factors (van den Berg, 2001). In essence, we therefore estimate a 2-level multilevel model (monthly 
information nested within individuals) with fixed effects for the order of the multiple spells.  
 
4. Results	  
4.1	  Descriptive	  statistics	  
Table 2 contrasts the unemployment rates for immigrants and natives from Eurostat with the 
average unemployment duration for immigrants and natives from the ECHP. The cross-country 
pattern for unemployment rates differs somewhat from the pattern for durations. Notably, it is not in 
the two Scandinavia countries where immigrants experience the most persistent unemployment 
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spells and the nativity gap is much smaller when considering unemployment durations rather than 
unemployment rates. This is especially the case for Finland where the unemployment rate of 
immigrants is twice as high as the rate of natives, while the average unemployment duration of the 
two groups is roughly the same. Such differences emerge also for Austria, Portugal, Greece and 
Luxembourg. In contrast, in Belgium and France, the much larger unemployment rates for 
immigrants go alongside with much longer unemployment durations. The differences in the cross-
country variation between rates and duration highlight the necessity to investigate both aspects and 
not just unemployment rates (or incidence) as previous studies have done. 
 
Table 2: Unemployment rates and average unemployment durations in months for immigrants and 
natives in Europe 
	   Rates*	   Durations**	  
	  
Natives	   Immigrants	   Ratio	   Natives	   Immigrants	   Ratio	  
Finland	   11,6	   24,4	   2,1	   10,0	   9,8	   0,98	  
Denmark	   4,8	   14,2	   3,0	   8,5	   13,7	   1,61	  
Belgium	   7,7	   25,0	   3,2	   18,2	   35,3	   1,94	  
Germany	   8,2	   …	   …	   16,2	   31,7	   1,96	  
France	   11,2	   21,7	   1,9	   15,3	   36,7	   2,40	  
Austria	   4,2	   9,3	   2,2	   9,1	   10,3	   1,13	  
Luxembourg	   1,7	   7,1	   4,2	   8,8	   9,6	   1,09	  
Italy	   …	   …	   …	   20,2	   20,6	   1,02	  
Spain	   15,5	   17,2	   1,1	   11,3	   11,6	   1,03	  
Portugal	   4,6	   10,9	   2,4	   12,4	   16,4	   1,32	  
Greece	   11,8	   15,8	   1,3	   14,3	   11,3	   0,79	  
UK	   5,9	   9,7	   1,6	   13,4	   14,7	   1,10	  
*Source: Eurostat (1999). 
** Source: Based on calculations from the ECHP. The extended mean duration is presented here. This is calculated by 
extending the survival curve exponentially to zero. 
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Figure 1 presents the associations between the nativity unemployment-duration gap and the 
four institutional variables at the macro level; replacement rate of the unemployment benefit, size of 
the secondary sector, EPL and proportion of asylum seekers. The first graph indicates a positive 
association between the nativity unemployment-duration gap and the benefit replacement rate. This 
supports Hypothesis 1, which suggests that there are disincentive effects of generous benefits for 
immigrants and thereby also the findings of previous studies that used unemployment incidence 
instead of unemployment duration. However, the association is not clear-cut. For instance in 
Finland, immigrants have access to generous benefits with high replacement rates, while the 
unemployment-duration gap is comparable to Spain and Italy.  
 
Figure 1: The nativity unemployment-duration gap and the institutional variables 
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The descriptive statistics also support the hypotheses about the effect of employment 
structure and immigration policy. In greater detail, as shown in the last graph, a humanitarian 
focused immigration policy appears to have the expected negative implications for the employment 
opportunities of immigrants (Hypothesis 5) while the second graph indicates that a large secondary 
sector fosters labour market integration (Hypothesis 4). However, the third graph does not suggest 
that a strict EPL increases the unemployment-duration gap between immigrants and natives 
(Hypothesis 3). 
	  
4.2	  Multivariate	  analysis	  
The next step is to investigate whether the correlations between host country features and the 
unemployment-duration gap are corroborated by multivariate analysis. In total we estimate 6 
different survival models. Models 1, 3 and 5 explore exits to inactivity and employment, whilst 
Models 2, 4 and 6 examine transitions into inactivity, the secondary and primary labour market. 
Within each set of 3 models, the first serves as a reference since it includes no measures for 
institutions/structures (Model 1 and 2). The specification of the second and third model differs in 
the operationalisation of unemployment benefits. More specifically, in Models 3 and 4, benefits are 
measured with a dummy indicating whether the individual receives benefits or not. In Models 5 and 
6, benefits are measured by the replacement rate – the amount of unemployment benefit relative to 
the last monthly salary. By looking at the model-fit measures (see the bottom of Tables 3 and 4), we 
conclude that models, which control for host country features and operationalise unemployment 
benefits as replacement rate (Models 5 and 6) are to be preferred.8 
Table 3 presents the results from Models 1 and 2. The coefficients for the dummies 
indicating the region of origin indicate that immigrants are less likely to exit to employment than 
natives (see Model 1). Immigrants from Asia are the most disadvantaged group. When 
distinguishing between exits to the primary and to the secondary labour market (Model 2), it is 
evident that this effect is stronger for transitions into the primary sector for immigrants coming 
from Eastern Europe and from Asia and for transitions into the secondary labour market for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 According to the guidelines defined by Raftery (1995), when the BIC improves with more than 10, the evidence in 
favor of the extended model is very strong.  
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immigrants coming from Africa and South America. Finally, the only significant difference 
between immigrants and natives for transitions to inactivity emerges for migrants coming from 
Africa. These immigrants are significantly less likely to move to inactivity.  
 
Table 3: Results from the competing risk duration model without institutional variables* 
	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	  
	  	   Inactivity	   Employment	   Inactivity	   Secondary	  sector	  
Primary	  
sector	  
Intercept	   -­‐7,706	  
(0,156)	  
-­‐2,654	  
(0,069)	  
-­‐7,389	  
(0,147)	  
-­‐4,164	  
(0,112)	  
-­‐3,510	  
(0,096)	  
Individual	  level	  
Eastern	  Europe	  
	  
0,134	  
(0,180)	  
	  
-­‐0,574	  
(0,134)	  
	  
-­‐0,073	  
(0,167)	  
	  
-­‐0,263	  
(0,198)	  
	  
-­‐0,546	  
(0,185)	  
Africa	  
-­‐0,277	  
(0,212)	  
-­‐0,528	  
(0,120)	  
-­‐0,372	  
(0,205)	  
-­‐0,719	  
(0,190)	  
-­‐0,255	  
(0,148)	  
Asia	  
-­‐0,064	  
(0,307)	  
-­‐0,920	  
(0,210)	  
-­‐0,193	  
(0,295)	  
-­‐0,258	  
(0,325)	  
-­‐1,204	  
(0,327)	  
South	  America	  
0,210	  
(0,245)	  
-­‐0,154	  
(0,176)	  
0,170	  
(0,229)	  
-­‐0,363	  
(0,334)	  
0,206	  
(0,232)	  
Country	  of	  origin	  unknown	  
0,166	  
(0,113)	  
-­‐0,780	  
(0,083)	  
0,050	  
(0,105)	  
-­‐0,162	  
(0,127)	  
-­‐1,017	  
(0,113)	  
Age	  
-­‐0,059	  
(0,010)	  
0,053	  
(0,007)	  
-­‐0,052	  
(0,009)	  
0,025	  
(0,011)	  
0,075	  
(0,010)	  
Age2	   0,001	  
(0,000)	  
-­‐0,001	  
(0,000)	  
0,001	  
(0,000)	  
-­‐0,001	  
(0,000)	  
-­‐0,002	  
(0,000)	  
Female	   0,547	  
(0,056)	  
-­‐0,110	  
(0,030)	  
0,559	  
(0,054)	  
-­‐0,900	  
(0,051)	  
0,464	  
(0,041)	  
Children<12	  years	   -­‐0,039	  
(0,081)	  
0,034	  
(0,035)	  
-­‐0,067	  
(0,079)	  
0,182	  
(0,050)	  
-­‐0,120	  
(0,053)	  
Married	   -­‐0,018	  
(0,074)	  
0,472	  
(0,037)	  
0,044	  
(0,071)	  
0,326	  
(0,057)	  
0,440	  
(0,054)	  
Female*children	   0,535	  
(0,088)	  
-­‐0,309	  
(0,046)	  
0,502	  
(0,085)	  
-­‐0,285	  
(0,067)	  
-­‐0,242	  
(0,064)	  
Female*married	   0,644	  
(0,080)	  
-­‐0,451	  
(0,045)	  
0,544	  
(0,077)	  
-­‐0,054	  
(0,071)	  
-­‐0,506	  
(0,063)	  
Medium	  education	   -­‐0,185	  
(0,039)	  
0,049	  
(0,027)	  
-­‐0,168	  
(0,037)	  
-­‐0,621	  
(0,038)	  
0,725	  
(0,033)	  
High	  education	   -­‐0,260	  
(0,054)	  
0,414	  
(0,031)	  
-­‐0,177	  
(0,052)	  
-­‐1,649	  
(0,070)	  
1,512	  
(0,042)	  
Equivalent	  household	  income	   0,001	  
(0,003)	  
0,031	  
(0,001)	  
0,005	  
(0,003)	  
0,016	  
(0,002)	  
0,033	  
(0,002)	  
Duration	  dependence	   0,185	  
(0,018)	  
0,085	  
(0,012)	  
0,274	  
(0,018)	  
0,011	  
(0,014)	  
0,037	  
(0,014)	  
Spell	  ongoing	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  
survey	  
-­‐0,670	  
(0,062)	  
-­‐0,864	  
(0,040)	  
-­‐0,825	  
(0,060)	  
-­‐0,703	  
(0,059)	  
-­‐0,772	  
(0,053)	  
Country	  level	   	  
-­‐0,009	  
	  
-­‐0,044	  
	  
-­‐0,015	  
	  
-­‐0,023	  
	  
-­‐0,068	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Unemployment	  rate	   (0,004)	   (0,003)	   (0,004)	   (0,004)	   (0,004)	  
Finland**	   0,250	  
(0,100)	  
0,526	  
(0,057)	  
0,228	  
(0,095)	  
0,459	  
(0,103)	  
0,534	  
(0,073)	  
Denmark	   0,194	  
(0,010)	  
0,145	  
(0,060)	  
0,216	  
(0,094)	  
0,433	  
(0,098)	  
-­‐0,143	  
(0,077)	  
Belgium	   -­‐0,242	  
(0,113)	  
-­‐0,263	  
(0,067)	  
-­‐0,212	  
(0,106)	  
-­‐0,042	  
(0,114)	  
-­‐0,594	  
(0,088)	  
France	   -­‐0,281	  
(0,094)	  
-­‐0,012	  
(0,052)	  
-­‐0,267	  
(0,089)	  
0,097	  
(0,091)	  
-­‐0,100	  
(0,069)	  
Austria	   0,394	  
(0,120)	  
0,333	  
(0,071)	  
0,428	  
(0,114)	  
0,533	  
(0,114)	  
-­‐0,098	  
(0,103)	  
Luxembourg	   0,711	  
(0,200)	  
-­‐0,023	  
(0,121)	  
0,660	  
(0,190)	  
0,012	  
(0,270)	  
-­‐0,037	  
(0,176)	  
Italy	   0,387	  
(0,076)	  
-­‐0,538	  
(0,047)	  
0,307	  
(0,072)	  
-­‐0,234	  
(0,084)	  
-­‐0,770	  
(0,065)	  
Spain	   0,502	  
(0,078)	  
0,088	  
(0,047)	  
0,481	  
(0,073)	  
0,462	  
(0,085)	  
-­‐0,132	  
(0,065)	  
Portugal	   -­‐0,017	  
(0,094)	  
-­‐0,152	  
(0,058)	  
-­‐0,078	  
(0,089)	  
0,228	  
(0,093)	  
-­‐0,463	  
(0,078)	  
Greece	   0,522	  
(0,084)	  
-­‐0,460	  
(0,053)	  
0,418	  
(0,079)	  
-­‐0,066	  
(0,090)	  
-­‐0,686	  
(0,068)	  
UK	   0,427	  
(0,121)	  
-­‐0,294	  
(0,074)	  
0,394	  
(0,116)	  
-­‐0,581	  
(0,130)	  
-­‐0,026	  
(0,096)	  
Individual	   level	   variance	  
(random	  effects)	  
-­‐0,515	  
(0,039)	  
0,970	  
(0,018)	  
0,087	  
(0,032)	  
-­‐1,329	  
(0,022)	  
1,271	  
(0,022)	  
AIC	  	   206986,62	   227734,82	  
BIC	   207642,40	   228718,49	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
*Bold	  coefficients	  indicate	  significance	  at	  a	  5%	  level	  while	  bold	  and	  italic	  indicates	  a	  10%	  significance	  level.	  
**Germany	  is	  the	  reference	  category.	  Note:	  Spell	  sequence	  and	  year-­‐dummies	  are	  controlled	  for,	  but	  the	  results	  are	  not	  presented	  
in	  the	  table. 
 
We now turn to Table 4 that presents the models, which include measures for host country 
institutions/structures. More specifically, Models 3 and 4 include the macro-level indicators and a 
dummy, which indicates whether a person receive unemployment benefits or not, while Models 5 
and 6 operationalize unemployment benefits with 4 dummies corresponding to different 
replacement levels (0 to 25%, 25% to 50%, 50% to 75% and larger than 75%). In all these models, 
we allow for differences in the effects of institutions/structures between immigrants and natives by 
including interactions. Specifically, the main effect for migrants is operationalized in the same way 
as in Models 1 and 2, namely with dummies for the region of origin. Due to the loss of statistical 
power, we could only include an interaction between a general dummy for immigrants and each 
institution/structure.9 The results from the first column of the 2-exit model (Model 3), suggest that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This is similar to the approach of Kogan (2006).  
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unemployment benefits reduce the risk of becoming inactive. If we look at the interaction between 
benefits and immigrants, we notice that this effect is stronger for immigrants than for natives, but 
this difference is not statistically significant. Moreover, as the second column of Model 3 suggests, 
both for immigrants and for natives benefits are unrelated to the likelihood of making a transition to 
employment. When approaching benefit exhaustion, however, job seekers (both immigrants and 
natives) are more likely to make a transition to employment. This is because the reservation wage 
decreases and thus job seekers are willing to accept inferior job offers. The picture does not change 
when we distinguish between exits to the primary and the secondary labour market (Model 4). The 
only difference is that the interaction effect between benefits and the immigrant dummy is negative 
for exits to the secondary labour market (-0.103) while it is positive for the primary labour market 
(0.124). This suggests that benefits increase the reservation wage of immigrants for the secondary 
labour market, but provide better resources for efficient job search in the primary labour market. 
However, this evidence is weak as the interaction effects are not statistically significant. 
In Models 5 and 6, the benefit dummy is replaced by 4 dummies that correspond to benefits 
at different replacement rates, which allows us to examine whether benefit generosity influences the 
nativity unemployment-duration gap. Only the dummies indicating a replacement rate lower than 
25% and larger than 75% are interacted with the immigrant dummy. The interaction terms with the 
two midst replacement-rate levels are not included as these were insignificant and their inclusion 
deteriorated the model fit.10 The main effects of the dummies for the replacement rates in Models 5 
and 6 reveal a U-shaped effect of replacement rate on transitions to employment for natives. In 
greater detail, the results suggest non-significant employment effects for low replacement rates, 
negative effects for medium-replacement rates and positive effects for high replacement rates. The 
results of Model 6 suggest that this U-shape effect is rather similar for exits to the secondary and 
primary labour markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For the same reason, we also exclude the interaction effect between the lowest replacement-rate dummy and benefit 
exhaustion. 
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Table 4: Results from the competing risk duration model including institutional variables* 
	   Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
	  	   Inact.  Empl. Inact. Sec. Prim. Inact Empl. Inact. Sec. Prim. 
Eastern	  Europe	   2,061 
(1,903) 
-3,996 
(1,353) 
1,949 
(1,860) 
-3,825 
(1,916) 
-4,444 
(1,510) 
1,807 
(1,889) 
-3,573 
(1,307) 
1,776 
(1,847) 
-3,716 
(1,868) 
-4,238 
(1,492) 
Africa	   1,559 
(1,871) 
-3,715 
(1,317) 
1,412 
(1,831) 
-3,985 
(1,852) 
-3,833 
(1,471) 
1,311 
(1,857) 
-3,288 
(1,274) 
1,248 
(1,817) 
-3,843 
(1,806) 
-3,615 
(1,453) 
Asia	   1,921 
(1,898) 
-3,960 
(1,331) 
1,780 
(1,858) 
-3,496 
(1,902) 
-4,796 
(1,502) 
1,626 
(1,890) 
-3,523 
(1,285) 
1,579 
(1,850) 
-3,315 
(1,848) 
-4,566 
(1,482) 
South	  America	   2,201 
(1,907) 
-3,441 
(1,366) 
2,111 
(1,866) 
-3,778 
(1,894) 
-3,489 
(1,503) 
1,991 
(1,895) 
-3,060 
(1,326) 
1,975 
(1,854) 
-3,706 
(1,852) 
-3,230 
(1,487) 
Country	  of	  origin	  unknown	   1,757 
(1,779) 
-3,876 
(1,234) 
1,570 
(1,741) 
-3,207 
(1,760) 
-4,612 
(1,405) 
1,461 
(1,763) 
-3,446 
(1,189) 
1,363 
(1,726) 
-3,012 
(1,707) 
-4,396 
(1,386) 
Benefit	  exhaustion	   1,098 
(0,058) 
0,209 
(0,048) 
1,102 
(0,058) 
0,090 
(0,075) 
0,319 
(0,061) 
1,088 
(0,057) 
0,214 
(0,046) 
1,093 
(0,057) 
0,100 
(0,071) 
0,320 
(0,059) 
Unempl.	  Benefits	  
-0,518 
(0,046) 
-0,021 
(0,023) 
-0,563 
(0,045) 
0,031 
(0,032) 
0,020 
(0,031) ... … … ... ... 
Unempl.	  Benefits*Non-­‐EU	   -0,193 
(0,164) 
0,049 
(0,109) 
-0,156 
(0,158) 
-0,103 
(0,158) 
0,124 
(0,149) 
... … … ... ... 
Unempl.	  Benefits*exhaustion	   -0,348 
(0,134) 
0,301 
(0,080) 
-0,349 
(0,134) 
0,501 
(0,112) 
0,053 
(0,113) 
… … … … … 
	  
Replacement	  rate	  <	  25	  %	  
 
... 
 
… 
 
… 
 
... 
 
... 
 
-0,323 
(0,086) 
 
-0,020 
(0,040) 
 
-0,421 
(0,084) 
 
0,094 
(0,057) 
 
0,072 
(0,054) 
Replacement	  rate	  >25%	  &<50%	   ... … … ... ... -0,601 
(0,071) 
-0,185 
(0,032) 
-0,655 
(0,069) 
-0,173 
(0,048) 
-0,076 
(0,044) 
Replacement	  rate	  >50%	  &<75%	   ... … … ... ... -0,582 
(0,065) 
-0,117 
(0,031) 
-0,628 
(0,064) 
-0,084 
(0,043) 
-0,076 
(0,043) 
Replacement	  rate	  >75	  %	   ... … … ... ... -0,541 
(0,063) 
0,189 
(0,028) 
-0,550 
(0,061) 
0,229 
(0,040) 
0,173 
(0,040) 
Non-­‐EU*repl.	  >0	  	  &	  <25%	   ... … … ... ... -1,163 
(0,529) 
-0,071 
(0,206) 
-1,061 
(0,518) 
-0,208 
(0,285) 
-0,059 
(0,262) 
Non-­‐EU*repl.	  >25%	  &<50%	   … … … … … NS NS NS NS NS 
Non-­‐EU*repl.	  >50%	  &<75%	   … … … … … NS NS NS NS NS 
Non-­‐EU*repl.	  >75	  %	  
	  
… … … … … 0,234 
(0,211) 
-0,361 
(0,122) 
0,171 
(0,204) 
-0,573 
(0,184) 
-0,143 
(0,162) 
Exhaust.*	  repl.	  >0	  	  &	  <25%	   … … … … … NS NS NS NS NS 
Exhaust.*	  repl.	  25%	  &	  <50%	  
	  
… … … … … -0,287 
(0,244) 
0,422 
(0,131) 
-0,258 
(0,243) 
0,679 
(0,174) 
0,126 
(0,195) 
Exhaust.*	  repl.	  50%&<75%	  
	  
… … … … … -0,305 
(0,228) 
0,140 
(0,134) 
-0,292 
(0,227) 
0,424 
(0,176) 
-0,234 
(0,205) 
Exhaust.*	  repl.	  >75	  %	   … … … … … -0,452 
(0,236) 
0,438 
(0,120) 
-0,462 
(0,235) 
0,594 
(0,162) 
0,241 
(0,174) 
	  
EPL	  
 
0,002 
(0,088) 
 
0,086 
(0,045) 
 
0,019 
(0,086) 
 
0,044 
(0,066) 
 
0,141 
(0,061) 
 
0,009 
(0,088) 
 
0,089 
(0,045) 
 
0,025 
(0,086) 
 
0,055 
(0,067) 
 
0,143 
(0,061) 
Non-­‐EU*EPL	   0,140 
(0,158) 
-0,069 
(0,106) 
0,162 
(0,154) 
-0,114 
(0,161) 
-0,122 
(0,140) 
0,169 
(0,160) 
-0,091 
(0,105) 
0,190 
(0,155) 
-0,158 
(0,164) 
-0,142 
(0,141) 
	  
Size	  of	  sec.	  lab.	  
 
0,129 
(0,066) 
 
-0,045 
(0,035) 
 
0,113 
(0,065) 
 
-0,009 
(0,048) 
 
-0,003 
(0,050) 
 
0,127 
(0,066) 
 
-0,046 
(0,035) 
 
0,112 
(0,065) 
 
-0,012 
(0,048) 
 
-0,002 
(0,050) 
Size	  of	  sec.	  lab.2	   -0,002 
(0,001) 
0,001 
(0,001) 
-0,002 
(0,001) 
0,000 
(0,001) 
-0,000 
(0,001) 
-0,002 
(0,001) 
0,001 
(0,001) 
-0,002 
(0,001) 
0,000 
(0,001) 
-0,000 
(0,001) 
Non-­‐EU*size	   -0,116 
(0,125) 
0,257 
(0,085) 
-0,111 
(0,122) 
0,281 
(0,121) 
0,288 
(0,098) 
-0,103 
(0,124) 
0,238 
(0,083) 
-0,103 
(0,122) 
0,276 
(0,119) 
0,282 
(0,097) 
Non-­‐EU*size2	   0,001 
(0,002) 
-0,004 
(0,001) 
0,001 
(0,002) 
-0,004 
(0,002) 
-0,004 
(0,002) 
0,001 
(0,002) 
-0,003 
(0,001) 
0,001 
(0,002) 
-0,004 
(0,002) 
-0,004 
(0,002) 
	  
%	  of	  asylum	  seekers	  
 
-0,037 
(0,059) 
 
0,145 
(0,029) 
 
-0,031 
(0,058) 
 
0,240 
(0,044) 
 
0,056 
(0,039) 
 
-0,035 
(0,059) 
 
0,143 
(0,029) 
 
-0,030 
(0,058) 
 
0,236 
(0,044) 
 
0,056 
(0,039) 
Non-­‐EU*asylum	  seekers	   0,010 
(0,087) 
-0,236 
(0,060) 
-0,033 
(0,084) 
-0,254 
(0,084) 
-0,202 
(0,081) 
-0,029 
(0,086) 
-0,225 
(0,060) 
-0,051 
(0,083) 
-0,237 
(0,085) 
-0,197 
(0,081) 
AIC	   206403,31 227080,70 206252,40 226953,88 
BIC	   207251,03 228352,28 207196,09 228369,41 
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*Bold coefficients indicate significance at a 5% level while bold and italic coefficients indicate a 10% significance 
level. The results for the control variables are presented in Table 5 in the Appendix. 
 
Differences between immigrants and natives on transitions to employment are only found 
for the highest replacement rates. In Model 5, the interaction effect between the immigrant dummy 
and the highest replacement rates is negative and significant (-0,361). In Model 6, this interaction 
effect is negative for exits to both segments of the labour market, but only significant for exits to the 
secondary labour market. Therefore, it seems that generous benefits increase the reservation wage 
of immigrants more than the reservation wage of natives. This is in line with Hypothesis 1 that 
anticipates such disincentive effects for immigrants when exiting to the secondary sector.  
To examine further the aforementioned findings, we plot the predicted probabilities for 
transitions to the secondary sector for immigrants and natives (see Figure 2). This figure shows that 
the most generous benefits have a positive effect for natives, but not for immigrants. More 
specifically, for immigrants, the transition probability to the secondary labour market is practically 
the same for those who do not receive benefits and those with the highest replacement rates. 
Therefore, in line with Hypothesis 2, there is no reason to believe that high replacement rates 
produce disincentive effects for immigrants. 
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities for transitions to the secondary labour market and different benefit 
levels* 
 
*Calculations are based on 6-12 months of unemployment. 
 
Estimates from Models 3 and 4 indicate that benefits prevent the unemployed from leaving 
the labour force, but this effect does not differ between immigrants and natives (see main and 
interaction effect of benefits for transitions to inactivity). However, when shifting our attention to 
Models 5 and 6, the picture varies according to the level of the replacement rate. Immigrants 
receiving low benefits are much less likely to exit to inactivity than natives. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3, which presents the predicted probabilities. As evident from this figure, the conditional 
probability of becoming inactive is roughly equal for immigrants and natives that do not receive 
benefits. In contrast, for those receiving low benefits, the conditional probability of becoming 
inactive is much lower (almost zero) for immigrants than for natives. Therefore, in accordance with 
Hypothesis 2, even low benefits are able to tackle the discouraged worker problem for immigrants.  
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Figure 3: Predicted probabilities for transitions to inactivity and different benefit levels* 
	  
*Calculations are based on 6-12 months of unemployment. 
 
Directing our attention towards the influence of labour market institutions, Models 3-6 show 
that strict EPL has a positive effect on transitions to employment for natives (see the main effect of 
EPL in Table 4). Models 4 and 6 suggest that this effect holds only for exits to the primary labour 
market. As the interaction effect of EPL with the immigrant dummy is statistically insignificant, we 
find no evidence of occupational segregation and increasing transitions to inactivity for immigrants 
due to strict EPL as anticipated in Hypothesis 3. This could be explained by the fact that the current 
study examines the influence of unemployment duration rather than incidence (see also Reyneri and 
Fullin, 2011).  
Turning to the impact of employment structure and in line with Hypothesis 4, the size of the 
low-skilled labour increases the conditional probability for an exit to employment for immigrants, 
but not for natives. Interestingly, this holds for exits to both the secondary and the primary labour 
market. It seems that although immigrants are overrepresented in the secondary sector, the 
increased availability of low-skilled jobs has spill-over effects that improve the overall labour 
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market position of immigrants. This becomes obvious in Figure 4 that presents the average 
predicted probabilities for natives and immigrants when the size of the low-skilled labour force is 
small (less than 22%) and large (more than 30%). When the low-skilled sector is small, immigrants 
have, on average, about a 2,5% lower predicted probability to enter employment than natives. This 
disadvantage reduces to about 0.5% when the low-skilled sector reaches 30%.  
 
Figure 4: Predicted probabilities for transitions to employment and size of the secondary sector* 
 
*Calculations are based on 6-12 months of unemployment. 
 
Finally, immigration policy also affects the employment opportunities of immigrants. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 5, the higher the percentage of asylum seekers, the lower is the 
likelihood for immigrants to make a transition to employment, both to the secondary and the 
primary labour markets (see Models 4 and 6). This is illustrated in Figure 5 that presents the 
average predicted probabilities for exits to the secondary labour market when the percentage of 
asylum seekers is small (less than 20%) and large (more than 40%). When there are few asylum 
seekers, the probability of moving to the secondary sector is, on average, similar for natives and 
immigrants. However, when the proportion of asylum seekers exceeds 40%, immigrants are more 
24	  
	  
disadvantaged. Finally, contrarily to Hypothesis 5, immigration policy is irrelevant for transitions to 
inactivity. 
 
Figure 5: Predicted probabilities for transitions into the secondary sector and proportion of asylum 
seekers* 
	  
*Calculations are based on 6-12 months of unemployment.	  
 
 
5. Conclusions	  and	  Discussion	  
Immigrants suffer from higher unemployment rates in Scandinavia and Continental Europe than in 
the Southern and Anglo-Saxon European countries. This has raised concern whether generous 
welfare states create disincentives for immigrant employment. Such a suspicion is reinforced by 
previous research that studied unemployment incidence and measured welfare generosity at welfare 
regime level (e.g. Kogan, 2006; Kesler, 2006). Contrarily to previous studies, we examined the 
effect of host country features – unemployment benefits, EPL, size of the low-skilled labour market 
and immigration policy – on the unemployment duration gap between immigrants and natives 
distinguishing between three exit states from unemployment (inactivity, secondary and primary 
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labour market exits). We tested empirically the comparative theoretical framework with the use of 
individual level measures for unemployment benefits. 
Our analysis reveals that immigrants from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe experience more 
persistent unemployment than natives especially when exiting to the primary labour market. 
However, immigrants in unemployment are typically less likely to become discouraged and leave 
the labour force than natives. Related to the effects of host country characteristics, our analysis 
suggests that disincentive effects of benefits, if any, are very small. In some cases, unemployment 
benefits even decrease transitions out of the labour force for immigrants (more than natives) and 
thereby prevent marginalisation. Therefore, our results do not indicate that the large unemployment-
duration gap between immigrants and natives in some countries is caused by the access to generous 
unemployment benefits.  
Our analysis also suggests that immigrants fare better in labour markets with a high demand 
for low-skilled labour. This is in line with the idea that as immigrants are over-represented in low-
skilled jobs, their labour market chances increase with the availability of such jobs. Surprisingly, 
this does not only concern the secondary labour market, but also the primary. A possible 
mechanism for this spill-over effect is that as the unemployment rate of immigrants tends to be 
relatively low in labour markets with a large secondary sector, immigrants are less likely to become 
stigmatised. Furthermore, immigrants probably also face less human capital depreciation when 
there is a high demand for low-skilled labour because it is easier for them to find a low-skilled job 
right away upon arrival. This job may then serve as a stepping-stone into a job in the primary 
sector.  
According to the comparative theoretical framework presented above, employment 
protection is suppose to intensify the division between insiders and outsiders on the labour market 
and drive immigrants to the group of the outsiders. This is not confirmed by our analysis. Strict 
EPL neither leads to longer unemployment duration for immigrants nor does it increase ethnic job-
segregation or transitions to inactivity.  
Finally, we expected that a humanitarian-oriented immigration policy is associated with 
poorer labour market integration of immigrants as refugees often face problems that make their 
labour market integration difficult. We indeed found evidence that the nativity unemployment-
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duration gap is larger in countries with many humanitarian migrants. However, our results do not 
indicate that a humanitarian immigration policy leads to increased dropouts from the labour force.          
All in all, we confirm that institutions impinge upon the labour market allocation of 
immigrants, but we contrast that access to social security has disincentive effects for immigrants. 
Our findings therefore have important implications for policy makers. It is important for policy 
makers to adapt their policies according to the type of migrants they receive and the general 
institutional structure. Countries with many humanitarian migrants and a low demand for low-
skilled labour need to provide more support for integrating their immigrant population on the labour 
market than those who have received many labour migrants and/or have a high demand for low-
skilled labour. An active integration strategy, which includes access to social protection for 
immigrants and participation in active labour market policies, is probably a necessary strategy for 
the Scandinavian and Continental European countries in order for their immigrants to overcome 
other employment barriers. In line with this, newly arrived immigrants have been offered official 
integration programmes throughout Scandinavia since the beginning of the new millennium. 
Sometimes, active participation is even a condition for benefit recipiency (Brochmann and 
Hagelund, 2011). Such policies are less developed in other European countries (Rinne, 2012).  
This study has also significant implications for future research. Our findings highlight the 
importance of examining the nativity unemployment duration gap, while measuring economic 
incentives at individual level rather than by including macro-level indicators. However, 
international surveys represent certain challenges for this and other comparative studies. Firstly, 
institutional and policy indicators are not always measured at individual level (e.g. benefit 
recipiency, immigration background, participation in active labour market policies). Secondly, the 
identification of immigrants and migration related variables are often not very detailed. The current 
study distinguishes between regions of birth, but it would have been ideal to obtain information 
about country of birth. Likewise, it was not possible to control for duration of residence and 
cultural-linguistic distance to the host country.11 The development of new international longitudinal 
datasets, which overcome these challenges, could facilitate more detailed research about the 
effectiveness of different integration efforts (e.g. introductory programmes) and better account for 
potential selection processes related to migration.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 These variables were unavailable for some countries or years.  
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Appendix - Table 5: Results for the control variables of the models presented in table 3* 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  Inact. Empl. Inact. Sec. Prim. Inact.  Empl.  Inact Sec. Prim. 
Intercept -9,071 
(0,864) 
-2,661 
(0,460) 
-8,661 
(0,847) 
-4,929 
(0,645) 
-3,930 
(0,656) 
-9,050 
(0,864) 
-2,658 
(0,461) 
-8,643 
(0,847) 
-4,922 
(0,645) 
-3,941 
(0,656) 
Individual level           
Age -0,045 
(0,009) 
0,052 
(0,007) 
-0,038 
(0,009) 
0,023 
(0,011) 
0,074 
(0,010) 
-0,045 
(0,009) 
0,052 
(0,007) 
-0,038 
(0,009) 
0,022 
(0,011) 
0,075 
(0,010) 
Age2 0,001 
(0,000) 
-0,001 
(0,000) 
0,001 
(0,000) 
-0,001 
(0,000) 
-0,002 
(0,000) 
0,001 
(0,000) 
-0,001 
(0,000) 
0,001 
(0,000) 
-0,001 
(0,000) 
-0,002 
(0,000) 
Female 0,547 
(0,055) 
-0,110 
(0,030) 
0,560 
(0,054) 
-0,894 
(0,052) 
0,460 
(0,041) 
0,546 
(0,055) 
-0,116 
(0,030) 
0,558 
(0,054) 
-0,895 
(0,052) 
0,448 
(0,041) 
Children<12 years -0,036 
(0,080) 
0,039 
(0,035) 
-0,055 
(0,079) 
0,176 
(0,051) 
-0,110 
(0,053) 
-0,038 
(0,080) 
0,043 
(0,035) 
-0,056 
(0,079) 
0,179 
(0,051) 
-0,112 
(0,053) 
Married 0,063 
(0,073) 
0,479 
(0,037) 
0,120 
(0,071) 
0,324 
(0,057) 
0,440 
(0,054) 
0,068 
(0,073) 
0,490 
(0,038) 
0,124 
(0,071) 
0,331 
(0,057) 
0,440 
(0,054) 
Female*children 0,529 
(0,087) 
-0,311 
(0,046) 
0,500 
(0,085) 
-0,271 
(0,067) 
-0,245 
(0,065) 
0,534 
(0,087) 
-0,328 
(0,046) 
0,501 
(0,085) 
-0,278 
(0,068) 
-0,251 
(0,065) 
Female*married 0,552 
(0,079) 
-0,456 
(0,045) 
0,466 
(0,077) 
0,040 
(0,072) 
-0,509 
(0,063) 
0,546 
(0,080) 
-0,465 
(0,045) 
0,461 
(0,077) 
0,040 
(0,071) 
-0,511 
(0,063) 
Medium edu. -0,185 
(0,039) 
0,045 
(0,024) 
-0,173 
(0,037) 
-0,630 
(0,038) 
0,721 
(0,034) 
-0,184 
(0,039) 
0,048 
(0,024) 
-0,171 
(0,037) 
-0,626 
(0,038) 
0,724 
(0,034) 
High edu. -0,275 
(0,054) 
0,406 
(0,031) 
-0,211 
(0,052) 
-1,646 
(0,070) 
1,508 
(0,042) 
-0,273 
(0,054) 
0,412 
(0,031) 
-0,208 
(0,052) 
-1,640 
(0,071) 
1,512 
(0,042) 
Equivalent household income 0,005 
(0,003) 
0,031 
(0,001) 
0,008 
(0,003) 
0,016 
(0,002) 
0,033 
(0,002) 
0,005 
(0,003) 
0,031 
(0,001) 
0,008 
(0,003) 
0,016 
(0,002) 
0,033 
(0,002) 
Second spell 0,041 
(0,047) 
0,521 
(0,023) 
0,008 
(0,046) 
0,709 
(0,035) 
0,341 
(0,030) 
0,042 
(0,047) 
0,519 
(0,023) 
0,008 
(0,046) 
0,704 
(0,035) 
0,342 
(0,030) 
Third spell 0,345 
(0,070) 
0,685 
(0,031) 
0,221 
(0,067) 
0,900 
(0,047) 
0,489 
(0,043) 
0,344 
(0,070) 
0,679 
(0,031) 
0,219 
(0,067) 
0,891 
(0,046) 
0,492 
(0,043) 
Fourth spell+ 0,558 
(0,084) 
0,885 
(0,035) 
0,280 
(0,078) 
1,153 
(0,055) 
0,654 
(0,052) 
0,561 
(0,084) 
0,878 
(0,035) 
0,282 
(0,079) 
1,144 
(0,054) 
0,662 
(0,052) 
Duration dependency 0,165 
(0,018) 
0,085 
(0,012) 
0,245 
(0,018) 
0,006 
(0,014) 
0,034 
(0,014) 
0,166 
(0,018) 
0,092 
(0,012) 
0,246 
(0,018) 
0,011 
(0,014) 
0,036 
(0,014) 
Spells ongoing at the start of 
the survey 
-0,734 
(0,063) 
-0,873 
(0,041) 
-0,879 
(0,061) 
-0,703 
(0,059) 
-0,767 
(0,054) 
-0,732 
(0,063) 
-0,894 
(0,041) 
-0,880 
(0,061) 
-0,722 
(0,059) 
-0,777 
(0,054) 
Country level 
Reg. unempl. Rate 
 
-0,007 
(0,004) 
 
-0,044 
(0,003) 
 
-0,012 
(0,004) 
 
-0,021 
(0,004) 
 
-0,069 
(0,004) 
 
-0,007 
(0,004) 
 
-0,045 
(0,003) 
 
-0,012 
(0,004) 
 
-0,022 
(0,004) 
 
-0,069 
(0,004) 
Finland** 0,322 
(0,133) 
0,731 
(0,071) 
0,340 
(0,129) 
0,713 
(0,120) 
0,679 
(0,094) 
0,318 
(0,133) 
0,695 
(0,071) 
0,332 
(0,129) 
0,693 
(0,120) 
0,642 
(0,094) 
Denmark 0,204 
(0,189) 
0,222 
(0,102) 
0,264 
(0,184) 
0,317 
(0,156) 
0,016 
(0,137) 
0,204 
(0,189) 
0,179 
(0,102) 
0,258 
(0,185) 
0,279 
(0,156) 
-0,032 
(0,137) 
Belgium -0,091 
(0,139) 
-0,417 
(0,079) 
-0,055 
(0,135) 
-0,367 
(0,130) 
-0,626 
(0,103) 
-0,093 
(0,139) 
-0,385 
(0,079) 
-0,050 
(0,135) 
-0,339 
(0,129) 
-0,622 
(0,104) 
France -0,449 
(0,135) 
-0,148 
(0,073) 
-0,429 
(0,131) 
-0,232 
(0,117) 
-0,153 
(0,100) 
-0,459 
(0,135) 
-0,162 
(0,074) 
-0,439 
(0,131) 
-0,234 
(0,116) 
-0,176 
(0,100) 
Austria 0,094 
(0,192) 
0,516 
(0,105) 
0,147 
(0,187) 
0,707 
(0,163) 
0,013 
(0,149) 
0,091 
(0,192) 
0,557 
(0,106) 
0,149 
(0,187) 
0,795 
(0,163) 
0,014 
(0,148) 
Luxembourg 0,296 
(0,226) 
0,026 
(0,132) 
0,240 
(0,219) 
0,019 
(0,309) 
-0,045 
(0,203) 
0,274 
(0,226) 
0,001 
(0,132) 
0,221 
(0,219) 
-0,084 
(0,283) 
-0,024 
(0,196) 
Italy -0,292 
(0,204) 
-0,245 
(0,104) 
-0,359 
(0,199) 
0,239 
(0,161) 
-0,681 
(0,141) 
-0,314 
(0,204) 
-0,244 
(0,104) 
-0,378 
(0,199) 
0,245 
(0,161) 
-0,689 
(0,141) 
Spain 0,094 
(0,164) 
-0,019 
(0,092) 
0,065 
(0,160) 
0,146 
(0,143) 
-0,119 
(0,128) 
0,080 
(0,164) 
-0,000 
(0,093) 
0,055 
(0,160) 
0,167 
(0,142) 
-0,113 
(0,128) 
Portugal -0,247 
(0,361) 
0,069 
(0,193) 
-0,355 
(0,354) 
0,639 
(0,275) 
-0,273 
(0,276) 
-0,254 
(0,361) 
0,056 
(0,194) 
-0,365 
(0,354) 
0,620 
(0,276) 
-0,277 
(0,276) 
Greece -0,127 
(0,232) 
-0,200 
(0,122) 
-0,215 
(0,227) 
0,324 
(0,184) 
-0,613 
(0,164) 
-0,153 
(0,232) 
-0,195 
(0,122) 
-0,237 
(0,227) 
0,314 
(0,184) 
-0,621 
(0,164) 
UK 0,194 
(0,263) 
-0,298 
(0,141) 
0,187 
(0,259) 
-0,782 
(0,219) 
0,231 
(0,188) 
0,170 
(0,263) 
-0,275 
(0,141) 
0,172 
(0,259) 
-0,736 
(0,218) 
0,224 
(0,188) 
Individual level variance 
(random effects) 
-0,436 
(0,040) 
0,971 
(0,018) 
0,073 
(0,033) 
-1,324 
(0,023) 
1,275 
(0,022) 
-0,434 
(0,040) 
0,980 
(0,018) 
0,076 
(0,033) 
-1,332 
(0,023) 
1,276 
(0,022) 
           
*Bold coefficients indicate significance at a 5% level while bold and italic indicates a 10% significance level.  
**Germany is the reference category. Note: Year-dummies are controlled for as well, but the results are not presented in the table. 
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1.	  Introduction	  
A comprehensive literature documents a nativity wage gap in Europe and in the ‘settler societies’. 
However, the size of this gap varies widely across countries even after controlling for education and 
other observed characteristics (Kesler 2010; Reitz 1998;  Adsera and Chiswick 2007; Algan et al. 
2010; Antecol et al. 2003). In some countries, wage inequalities between immigrants and natives 
are considerable, while in others they are small or even non-existent. The question is what drives 
these disparities in the wage gap between different countries? From studies on the gender wage gap, 
we know that the size of the pay gap between men and women depends on the existence and level 
of a statutory minimum wage (Blau and Kahn 2003). As immigrants constitute another vulnerable 
group over-represented in low-paid jobs, they are also likely to benefit more from minimum wage 
legislation. This paper applies the insights from gender studies to the nativity wage gap using a 
natural experiment. In other words, we ask to which extent the introduction of a national minimum 
wage reduces wage inequalities between immigrants and natives?  
A scarce literature suggests that the pay gap between immigrants and natives is smaller in 
countries or states with a high minimum wage (Antecol et al. 2006; Orrenius and Zavodny 2008; 
Butcher and DiNardo 2002; Chiswick et al. 2008; Kesler 2010). This also confirms the results from 
the literature on the gender wage gap. More specifically, Antecol et al. (2006) and Kesler (2010) 
base their conclusions on a comparison of average wages between native and foreign born in two to 
three countries, while Chiswick et al. (2008) consider the entire wage distributions instead of 
merely average wages. However, because countries vary in other ways than the level of the 
statutory minimum wage (e.g. union strength, collective bargaining coverage, welfare institutions), 
these studies are not able to identify the independent contribution of minimum wage regulation. 
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Butcher and DiNardo (2002) address this criticism by comparing differences in minimum wage 
levels between states and/or over time, which enables them to identify the impact of minimum wage 
legislation in a more precise manner. In greater detail, they show that as much as 50 % of the 
increase in the nativity wage gap between 1970 and 1990 is attributable to the decline in the 
minimum wage in that period (see also Orrenius and Zavodny, 2008).  
Common for these studies is that they focus on the ‘settler societies’ (the exception is 
Kesler, 2010). However, it is not given that the results can be generalised to a European context as 
the social models differ considerably, not only between the ‘settler societies’ and the European 
countries, but also within Europe (Hall and Soskice 2001). The Scandinavian countries are 
characterised by coordinated collective wage bargaining with the participation from strong trade 
unions and high levels of social expenditures, mainly financed via taxes. Even if the Scandinavian 
countries do not have a statutory minimum wage, these other institutional features compress the 
wages at the bottom end of the distribution. In Continental Europe, the welfare state relies on social 
contributions from those on the labour market. Their labour markets tend to be strongly regulated 
and although union densities are in decline, trade unions and the tradition of collective bargaining 
remain strong in many countries. Apart from wage setting via collective bargaining, some countries 
also have a statutory minimum wage that covers the whole (e.g. Belgium) or part of the labour 
market (e.g. the construction sector in Germany). The Anglo-Saxon countries represent the system 
that is the closest to the ‘settler societies’. In greater detail, the welfare state is the very last resort, 
the labour markets are more flexible and wage bargaining is decentralised due to weak trade unions. 
This contributes to more wage disparities. Despite of the limited role of collective bargaining, 
statutory minimum wages was only introduced in the UK and Ireland around the new millennium 
(Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; Esping-Andersen 1990; Gallie 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001).  
In most of Europe - Scandinavia and the Continental countries - the function of a national 
minimum wage may therefore already be filled. Likewise a statutory minimum wage, collective 
bargaining and a comprehensive welfare state decommodify workers and compress wages at the 
bottom to the potential benefit of immigrants. The few existing comparative analyses confirm this 
expectation. According to Kesler (2010), even if Sweden does not have a statutory minimum wage, 
inequalities between foreign born and natives are smaller than in the UK. She argues that these 
differences occur “...because immigrant/native-born wage gaps are magnified in the UK and 
minimized in Sweden by policies that shape the overall wage distribution” (Kesler, 2010: 584). In 
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Australia, the ‘settler country’ where collective bargaining plays a considerable role and welfare 
outcomes are the most equal Castles (1994), the average wage gap between natives and newly 
arrived immigrants is smaller than in Canada and the US where the wage setting is more flexible. 
Nonetheless, high wage mobility appears to pull in the other direction: wages of immigrants are 
improving more in Canada and the US than in Australia (Antecol et al., 2006; see also Antecol et al. 
2003). Wage assimilation may therefore be attained more or less right away in Australia due to high 
levels of union coverage (see also Chiswick et al. 2008).  
The current study contributes to this literature by examining the impact of the introduction 
of statutory minimum wage policies on the wage gap between natives and non-EU migrants 
considering the entire wage distribution in the UK and Germany. Apart from having introduced 
statutory minimum wage regulations in the late 1990s, these countries represent two different social 
models (the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European) that vary with respect to general welfare 
state arrangements as well as the role of trade unions in the wage setting process. We test the 
hypothesis that the introduction of minimum wage legislation will result in a larger reduction of the 
nativity wage gap in the UK where workers are more exposed to the market forces than in 
Germany. The empirical strategy is to exploit the institutional variations by investigating 
differences in wage distributions, before and after the implementation of minimum wage 
regulations focusing on one immigrant sector in each country and applying a Difference-in-
Difference regression distribution approach (see further discussion in section 3). We use the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (UK-QLFS).  
The structure of the paper is the following: Section 2 describes the institutional context in 
Germany and the UK. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 contains the analysis, 
which includes descriptive statistics of the immigrant-native wage gap and the results from the 
distribution regression analysis. Conclusions and policy recommendations are presented in section 
5.  
 
2.	  Institutional	  context	  of	  wage	  setting	  
2.1	  The	  German	  social	  model	  at	  a	  crossroad	  
Bismarck laid the cornerstones to the German social model in the late 1880s. The German social 
model or the Bismarck model builds on a strong corporate tradition and focuses on wage earners 
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who have ‘standard employment relationships’ (Hinrichs 2010). Hinrich (2010) highlights three 
hierarchically ordered institutional elements. The first element is the labour policies that manifested 
itself in the comprehensive individual and collective rights which are incorporated into work 
contracts. These labour policies are part of the ongoing negotiations between the state and the social 
partners. The second element is the social insurance schemes, which provides wage replacement in 
the case of unemployment and other well defined social contingencies. The social insurance 
schemes also rest on the concept of ‘standard employment relationships’ as they are financed by 
contributions from employers and employees. The third element is the poverty policies, which are 
basic and means-tested benefits unrelated to previous earnings. They cover those in need including 
individuals who are outside the labour force.  
 
2.1.1	  Centralised	  and	  coordinated	  wage	  setting	  with	  strong	  trade	  unions	  
A key feature of the German social model is the centralised and coordinated wage setting where 
wages are concluded by means of collective wage bargaining, a right that is granted to the social 
partners by the constitution. Collective bargaining coverage reaches around 70 % of all private 
sector employees, which is also an indication of union strength. Nevertheless, trade union densities 
are notably lower than coverage rates (see Figure 1). Visser (1986) argues that the low density 
levels are not a serious drawback, because corporatism and the union’s strong legal position 
enhances their institutional security and establishes some sort of union monopoly, which reduces 
their need and incentive to mobilize workers.  
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Figure 1: Trade union coverage and density, West Germany, 1995-2009 (%)  
 
Source: Visser (2011). 
 
Wage bargaining between trade unions and employers’ associations takes place at sector 
level. Most of these settlements do not apply to the entire country, but rather to specific regions. A 
notable exception is the construction industry where negotiations are at national level. Generally, 
there are rather large variations in the coverage rates between different sectors and regions, with a 
tendency that coverage is relatively low in the service sector (e.g. health and social work) and in the 
East German labour market (Funk and Lesch 2006; Funk and Lesch 2005). In addition to the 
sectoral agreements, Germany also has a large number of company agreements, which are 
concluded directly by trade unions and companies that are not members of an employers’ 
association (Bispinck 2008).  
Until the 1990s, most pay agreements were renegotiated on an annual basis, but recently this 
has changed to every second year. Monthly remuneration, which can vary between blue and white-
collar workers, usually consists of several elements. The monthly basic wage is supposed to create a 
wage floor. On top of this, is the performance-related remuneration, bonuses modulated according 
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to function and occupation, pay for arduous work and extra hours. Additionally there are also 
annual payments e.g. vacation bonuses. The number of wage groups varies between four and fifteen 
according to sector and the spread in the wages ranges from 115 % to 390 % (Bispinck, 2008).  
Since the beginning of large-scale migration to Germany, trade unions have been advocating 
for the inclusion of immigrants into the German social model (Kuhne 2000). One of the first 
examples is their involvement in the tripartite negotiations within the board of administration of the 
Federal Institutions for Labour in the 1950s and 1960s. Here, the trade unions fought for and 
obtained complete equality for immigrants concerning pay and legislation on labour and welfare. 
Another example relates to the duties of the works councils, where the Employees Representation 
Act requires that the works council and employer must ensure that there is no discrimination based 
on race, religion, nationality or origin (§ 75). Furthermore, the work councils also have the duty of 
“...integrating foreign workers at their place of work and promoting understanding between them 
and the German workers' (§ 80). This relates to all areas including integrating immigrants into the 
works councils (Kuhne 2000).  
 
2.1.2	  Low	  pay	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  minimum	  wages	  
In Germany - as in most other European countries - trade unions face a declining capacity to settle 
and enforce attractive wage agreements. Even the collective agreements do no longer automatically 
protect workers against low pay (Bispinck 2008). At the European level, this is explained by 
intensified international trade and capital movements within the EU, but also with the rest of the 
world (Keune 2008). At the national level, additional explanatory factors are the high 
unemployment rates during the 1990s and until the beginning of the new millennium, the German 
reunification, declining trade union densities and different waves of labour market flexibilisation 
and welfare reforms. All in all, these trends have tipped the balance between trade unions and the 
employers’ associations, giving the latter the power to push for further decentralisation in wage 
setting. This has resulted in what Keune (2008) refers to as unorganised decentralisation, a term 
otherwise only used for the UK.  
The unorganised decentralisation mainly manifests itself by the inclusion of opening clauses 
in the sectoral agreements and the increasing use of such clauses. The first example was the 
introduction of the so-called ‘hardship clauses’ during the first half of the 1990s. ‘Hardship clauses’ 
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made it possible for firms with serious economic troubles to suspend or deviate from the 
collectively agreed wages during a limited period. In recent years, these clauses are no longer only 
applicable in the case of economic hardship, but also in order for a company to boost 
competitiveness. Another sign of the unorganised decentralisation is the introduction of more and 
more provisions that allow companies to base part of the remuneration on profitability (Bispinck 
2008). Finally, firms increasingly leave the employers organisations, which leads to declining 
collective bargaining coverage (Keune 2008). As a result fewer extended collective agreements are 
granted (Kirsch 2003).12 
This trend has given rise to an upcoming low paid segment that affects about 20-25 % of the 
labour force (Bispinck 2008). A much-debated solution to the problem is the introduction of a 
statutory minimum wage, which according to its supporters would secure an effective and higher 
wage floor. In the late 1990s, the first minimum wage regulation was adapted in the different 
sectors of construction. These sector specific minimum wages were based on regulations adopted to 
implement the EU directive on the posting of workers. According to this directive, firms that send 
workers from third countries to the European Union are forced to comply with local labour laws. 
The introduction of statutory minimum wages in these sectors can therefore be seen as a strategy to 
negate social dumping. Prior to this law, posted workers were typically paid at the rate of their 
home country. The first and most far-reaching branch specific minimum wage was introduced in 
January 1997 in the Main Construction Industry (Funk and Lesch 2005). At the time of its 
introduction, the hourly statutory minimum wage was 8,69 € in West Germany and 8,00 € in East 
Germany. According to previous studies, the introduction of a minimum wage in the Main 
Construction Industry resulted in a positive wage growth effect in both East and West Germany. A 
negative employment effect is only detected in the Eastern part and is attributed to the relatively 
larger ‘bite’ of the new minimum wage (König and Möller 2009).   
 
2.2	  A	  residual	  and	  liberal	  British	  social	  model	  
Even though the British welfare state took the first tentative steps prior to the Second World War, it 
started developing with the Beveridge Report of 1942. Beveridge suggested a comprehensive and 
universal welfare state, but this was never fully implemented. In the 1980s, the British welfare state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Extended collective agreements are the inclusion of firms that are not members of employers’ associations. 
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had developed into a residual welfare state based on meagre and means-tested benefits as a last 
resort when private saving and insurances were exhausted (Harris 2000). Contrarily to the German 
case, the social partners played a less prominent role in building the British the social model and the 
state has been the key actor. All in all, the market forces are granted a freer rein in the UK than in 
Germany.   
 
2.2.1	  Weak	  trade	  unions	  and	  wage	  setting	  by	  management	  
Due to the absence of corporatism, the British trade unions do not enjoy the same privileged 
position as their German counterparts. The legal basis of trade unions and their collective 
bargaining rights are also weaker than in Germany due to a widespread belief in market forces and 
individualism (Hyman 2003; Fox 1986). During the early years, trade unionists suffered severe 
punitive sanctions (fines, imprisonments, deportation etc.). When trade unions eventually were 
legalised in the late 19th century, it was not formulated as a positive right, but it rather defined 
“...an area of industrial relations `immunities' where the effect of the common law was inhibited” 
(Hyman 2003: 38-39). Consequently, workers were free to organise themselves and call on a strike, 
but employers had the liberty to fire them for such actions. Trade unions were also free to pursue 
collective bargaining, but employers could refuse to negotiate. Even when collective agreements are 
reached they can easily be overturned as they are ‘binding in honour only’ (Hyman 2003). The 
British tradition is therefore characterised by unorganised decentralization and voluntarism, which 
also limits coordination between employers, workers and the state (Hyman 2003; Keune 2008).  
Collective bargaining is widespread in the British public sector, but not in the private (see 
Figure 2). The high occurrence in the public sector is probably also an important explanation for 
why overall density levels remain relatively high. In the private sector, the management determines 
the wages of 79 % of the employees unilaterally. An exception is industries that were recently 
privatised (e.g. Utilities and Transport and Communication). In these industries, collective 
bargaining coverage reaches more than 60 % (Exell 2008). Consequently, there are large variations 
in collective bargaining coverage even within the private sector.  
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Figure 2: Trade union coverage and density, the UK, 1996-2009 (%) 
 
Source: Visser (2011). 
 
As a way to secure a wage floor in low paid sectors, the government established the so-
called Trade Boards in 1909. These Trade Boards were the forerunner for the Wage Councils, 
which defined industry based minimum wages in sectors with low levels of collective wage 
bargaining coverage. However, the Wage Councils were abolished in 1993 by the Conservative 
government due to a belief that the minimum wages suppressed employment (Hyman 2003).  
In line with the rather reserved and withdrawn role of the British trade unions, they also 
adopted a rather pacifist strategy towards immigrants. Until the early 1970s, trade unions were even 
accused of having widespread racism and discrimination against immigrants and ethnic minorities 
within their own organisation. In order to address this criticism, the unions began to promote equal 
opportunities and the removal of barriers based on race and ethnic origin. Despite of these efforts, 
previous research suggests that blacks still have little faith in trade unions when it comes to fighting 
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racial discriminations and most rather seek the support of The Commission for Racial Equality 
(Wrench 2000).  
 
2.2.2	  Trade	  unions	  in	  free	  fall	  and	  introduction	  of	  minimum	  wages}	  
The British trade unions have been hit harder by membership defection than in any other European 
country. This is largely due to the introduction of legislation that limited their legal rights during the 
Thatcher years (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; Towers 1988). Together with the abolishment of the 
Wage Councils, this has resulted in an increasing problem of in-work poverty. In 1998, about 30 % 
of British female employees and 11 % of the men were affected by low pay.13 In order to defeat this 
problem, the newly elected Labour Government introduced a statutory minimum wage in April 
1999. The new minimum wage was about 5,40 € and thus rather modest compared to the one 
introduced in Germany. Previous research find that, the national minimum wage did raise the wages 
at the bottom end of the wage distribution mainly to the benefit of women and young people, but 
without causing adverse employment effects (e.g. Metcalf 2008). However, there appears to be a 
problem with compliance, as many still receive a wage that is below the minimum wage (Bargain et 
al. 2011; Robinson 2002).  
	  
3.	  Research	  approach	  
3.1	  Data	  	  
We use the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) and the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
(QLFS). Both datasets are standardized household surveys that cover the periods before and after 
the introduction of minimum wage regulations. The datasets provide extensive information on 
labour market status, pay, job, and demographic characteristics. 
The analysis focuses on male private sector employees from 20 to 65 years in two low-
skilled ‘immigrants sectors’. In the case of Germany, we select the Main Construction Sector as this 
was the largest and first sector where minimum wage regulations were introduced. Due to the fact 
that there are very few immigrants in the East German sample, we only focus on West Germany. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 http://www.poverty.org.uk/51/index.shtml?2 
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The construction sector is not an ‘immigrant sector’ in the UK, however (see also Kogan 2007). We 
therefore focus on another low skilled sector, namely the hotel and restaurant industry. In order to 
secure a sufficient sample size, we pool three years before and after the introduction of the 
minimum wage regulation in both countries. This means that we use the years 1994-2000 for 
Germany and 1996-2002 for the UK.  
The definition of immigrant status is based on country of birth rather than on citizenship. 
This definition is more comparable across countries since citizenship legislation differs 
considerably between the UK and Germany. After deleting immigrants from EU-15 countries, the 
samples include 1052 observations from GSOEP (509 before and 543 after) of which 363 are 
immigrants and 3392 observations from the UK QLFS (1741 before and 1651 after) of which 602 
are immigrants. 
The variable referring to hourly wage is central to the analysis. We construct the variable 
hourly wage based on last month’s salary and actual hours worked in the case of GSOEP. The 
variable ‘hourly pay’ is available in the QLFS and it is constructed in a similar way as we defined it 
in the GSOEP. In both cases, hourly pay is deflated using the Consumer Price Index. The year of 
the introduction of the minimum wage has the index value 100. 
The list of control variables includes measures for age, marital status, educational 
background, occupational level, health, and regional unemployment rates (see Table 1 below). As 
evident from this table, we detect a significant increase in average hourly wage after the 
introduction of the minimum wage only in the case of the UK. There appear to be no major 
adaptations in terms of the number of hours worked in any of the sectors. However, changes in the 
distribution of characteristics mainly occur for immigrants in the UK.  
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Table 1: Description of the data 
 Natives 
Before 
 
After 
 
Diff. 
Immigrants 
Before 
 
After 
 
Diff. 
German construction sector 
Hourly wage (€) 13,52 13,76 0,24 12,13 12,26    0,13 
Hours per week 41,18 42,14   0,96* 41,18 41,37 0,19 
Average age 40,25 40,74 0,49 42,12 43,30 1,18 
High school degree (%) 70,65 74,03 3,38 39,65 27,66 -11,99 
Low occupation (%) 4,83 5,05 0,22 29,39 21,27 -8,12 
Medium occupation (%) 61,83 64,78 2,95 52,75 58,43  5,68 
High occupation (%) 33,34 30,19  -3,15 17,86 20,30  2,44 
Married (%) 61,54 62,71   1,17 63,17 77,89 14,72* 
Health problems 56,74 55,86  -0,88 51,88 52,11  0,23 
The UK hotel/restaurant sector 
Hourly wage (£) 5,08 6,00 0,92* 4,61 5,31    0,70* 
Hours per week 48,02 48,50   0,48 45,64 45,61   -0,03 
Average age 32,50 32,88   0,38 34,79 32,67   -2,12* 
No/low educational level (%) 21,39 19,99 -1,40 67,70 75,51    7,81* 
Medium educational level (%) 64,11 64,01 -0,10 21,31 17,23   -4,08 
High educational level (%) 14,49 15,93  1,44 10,99 7,26   -3,73* 
Low occupation (%) 66,51 52,54 -13,97* 78,34 55,57 -22,77* 
Married (%) 36,96 33,11   -3,85* 75,92 67,75  -8,17* 
Health problems (%) 20,60 21,69  1,09 17,55 18,15 0,60 
* Indicates a significance level of 5 %. 
	  
3.2	  Empirical	  strategy	  
This study seeks to identify the impact of mandated minimum wage on the nativity wage gap across 
the distributions of wages in two sectors in Germany and the UK. We employ the distributional 
regression method proposed by Chernozhukov et al. (2013) in a Difference-in-Difference (DID) 
setting. This approach decomposes the impact of minimum wage regulation into a wage structure or 
price effect and a composition effect using counterfactual wage distributions. A similar strategy was 
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recently adopted by Bargain et al. (2011) to examine the distributional impact of a national 
minimum wage on the gender pay gap in the UK and Ireland.  
We assume that each observation is drawn from a joint distribution function F(w, Z, G, T) 
where w is wage, Z is a vector of wage determining personal attributes, G and T are indicator 
variables capturing group membership and the institutional settings prevailing at time h. In this 
context, G is an indicator variable equal to 1 (0) if the individual is foreign-born (native-born) and T 
= 1 (0) if the period of observation occurs after (before) the introduction of the minimum wage. 
Hence, Fg,h (w) = F(w | G = g, T = h) denotes the conditional distribution of wages observed among 
members of group g with institutional setting at time h. For our purpose, it is convenient to express 
Fg,h  as the counterfactual marginal wage distribution of group G = g at T = h integrated over the 
personal attributes of group G = i prevailing at time T = j :  
 
Using these notations, we can express the observed distributional change in the nativity wage gap 
following the introduction of statutory minimum wage regulations as: 
 
where (B) and (A) capture the immigrant wage gap before and after the introduction of a minimum 
wage – therefore before and after.   
 Equation above captures the impact of the reform under fairly implausible conditions. In 
particular, it requires that immigrants and natives share the same distribution of wage-determining 
attributes and that the new regulation does not trigger any compositional changes in these 
characteristics. To address this issue, we follow Bargain et al. (2011) and construct a series of 
counterfactual distributions, which allow us to impose that both groups share the distribution of 
characteristics, which we fix to that of the foreign-born. We can also construct:  
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the counterfactual marginal distribution when the wage structure is that of native workers before the 
policy change with the distribution of foreign-born characteristics before the reform. Likewise, 
€ 
F1,0
1,1 
is the counterfactual distribution of immigrant workers before if they were paid as immigrant 
workers after and 
€ 
F1,0
0,1, the counterfactual wage distribution of immigrants before if they were paid 
as natives before. 
After imposing that both groups exhibit the same distribution of characteristics by fixing 
their observable attributes to that of immigrants, we express the change in the nativity wage gap as:  
 
which can be further decomposed as:  
 
where PE is the institutional impact of the minimum wage reform (price effect) while CE captures 
the possible compositional change in foreign born characteristics following the reform, possibly 
through employment effects. Each counterfactual distribution 
€ 
Fi, j
g,h  is easily estimated by applying 
the distributional regression approach of Chernozhukov et al. (2013). Despite exploiting a source of 
plausibly exogenous variation, our decomposition exercise remains nonetheless somewhat 
descriptive. Any causal interpretation comes with two non-negligible caveats. As most 
contributions focussing on explaining the source of wage differential (see Butcher and DiNardo 
2002; Bargain et al. 2011), our decomposition exercise ignores general equilibrium effects – the 
distribution of personal characteristics is assumed independent of the wage structure. Furthermore, 
the identification of the ‘true’ impact of the reform depends on the standard parallel trend 
assumption that no other contemporaneous shocks (observed and/or unobserved) had a differential 
impact on the wage structure of native- and foreign-born workers during the period covered by our 
study.  
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4.	  Results	  
4.1	  Descriptive	  analysis	  
Figure 3 and 4 below presents the wage distributions of immigrants and natives, before and after the 
introduction of minimum wage regulations in the selected sectors. Prior to April 1999, the wage 
distributions in the UK hotel and restaurant sector are more concentrated at the bottom end, which 
also corroborate the existence of a downward pressure on wages in countries with a decentralised 
wage setting (Kesler 2010). Before the introduction of the minimum wage, immigrants were over-
represented in this part of the wage distribution. After the implementation of minimum wage 
legislation, the distributions of immigrants and natives are more similar. These findings are indeed a 
first indication that the minimum wage may have benefited more immigrants than natives in the 
UK.  
The wages in the German construction sector is more spread, which probably can be 
explained by the collectively agreed occupational remuneration. The ‘peak’ in the immigrant’s 
wage distribution around an hourly wage of 10 € (both before and after) indicates an effect of some 
sort of minimum wage regulation in Germany. The differences in the wage distributions of 
immigrants and natives between the two periods are less pronounced than in the case of the UK and 
if anything, they appear to have increased in the second period.  
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Figure 3: Kernel density estimates in Germany 
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Figure 4: Kernel density estimates in the UK 
 
 
 
When examining average wage differences between immigrants and natives before the 
introduction of statutory minimum wage regulations, it is evident that the nativity pay gap is similar 
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in the two sectors (see Table 2). In greater detail, on average immigrants in the British hotel and 
restaurant sector and the German construction industry earned around 10 % less than natives. There 
appear to be no reduction in the average nativity wage gap after the implementation of minimum 
wage legislation. 
 
Table 2: Average wages of immigrants and natives 
 Natives Immigrants Difference % 
Before 13,52 12,13 10,28* Hourly wage Germany (€) 
After 13,76 12,26 10,90* 
Before    5,08 4,61 9,25* Hourly wage the UK (£) 
After 6,00 5,31 11,5* 
* Indicates a significance level of 5 %.  
 
4.2	  Multivariate	  analysis	  
Figures 5 and 6 present three sets of distribution functions for each of the countries. The first set 
displays the wage distributions of immigrants and natives, before and after the introduction of the 
minimum wage in Germany and the UK. The figures in the middle show the counterfactual 
distributions where the covariates are fixed to those of immigrants. The last set of distributions 
display the counter-factual distributions where the covariates are fixed to immigrants before.  
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Figure 5: Cumulative wage distribution functions for immigrants and natives, before and after in 
Germany 
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Figure 6: Cumulative wage distribution functions for immigrants and natives, before and after in 
the UK 
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Prior to April 1999, a relatively large proportion of employees - especially immigrants - in 
the British hotel and restaurant sector received an hourly wage that was lower than 5,40 € or 3,60	  £. 
This is even the case when we attribute similar characteristics to natives and immigrants. As 
expected, this proportion was reduced after the implementation of minimum wage legislation, more 
so for immigrants than for natives (Figure 6). In the German construction sector, however, very few 
- both natives and immigrants - earned less than 8,69 € even before January 1997. This is also in 
line with Apel et al. (2012), who find that less than 4 % of the West German construction workers 
earned an hourly wage that is below this threshold. Even though there are great wage differences 
between immigrants and natives in the German construction sector, these differences are less 
pronounced at the bottom end of the distribution.  
Figures 7 and 8 offer a closer inspection of the nativity wage gap, before and after in 
Germany and the UK receptively. More specifically, we present the total nativity wage gap before 
and after the introduction of a statutory minimum wage (first set of figures). This gap is divided into 
a price effect (second set of figures) and a composition effect (third set of figures). 
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Figure 7: The nativity wage gap, before and after the introduction of minimum wages in Germany 
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Figure 8: The nativity wage gap, before and after the introduction of minimum wages in the UK 
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Figure 7 suggests that the new minimum wage did not affect the gap in Germany at any 
point of the wage distribution. The wage gap between immigrants and natives in the German 
construction sector is quite considerable with the exception of the bottom end of the distribution. 
These findings indicate that the strong trade unions had created a ‘wage floor’ to the benefit of low 
paid immigrants. Nevertheless, there could be a price to pay in terms of reduced upward earnings 
mobility, which is also in line with Chiswick et al. (2008).  
The argument of Chiswick et al. (2008) is to some extent corroborated by our analysis of the 
British hotel and restaurant sector. Prior to the introduction of minimum wage regulations, we 
identify a wage gap only at the very bottom end of the distribution (see Figure 8). The nativity wage 
gap that lies below the threshold for the new minimum wage has diminished after April 1999. 
However, during the same period, the wage gap has increased in the higher parts of the distribution.  
Figures 9 and 10 display the reductions in the nativity wage gap in Germany and the UK as 
a result of the introduction of a statutory minimum wage. The red lines represent a 95 % confidence 
interval. The first set of figures show the total reduction in the wage gap. This reduction is 
decomposed into a price effect or unexplained part (middle set of figures) and a composition effect 
or explained part (last set of figures).  
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Figure 9: Difference in difference in the nativity wage gap in Germany 
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Figure 10: Difference in difference in the nativity wage gap in the UK 
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As evident from Figure 9 and as Figure 7 also indicates, the change in the nativity wage gap 
is not statistically significant in the case of Germany at any point of the wage distribution. In the 
case of the UK, the change in the wage gap due to the implementation of the national minimum 
wage is statistically significant only at the bottom end of the wage distribution. Most of this 
reduction was due the price effect rather than changes in composition (Figure 10).  
 
5.	  Conclusion	  	  
The variations in the nativity wage gap across countries give rise to several questions: What are the 
drivers these variations? Can we learn from cross-country comparisons? Is a statutory minimum 
wage a solution for reducing wage inequalities between immigrants and natives in Europe? The aim 
of this study was to provide new insights about these largely unanswered questions. We use a 
natural experiment to investigate the implications of minimum wage legislation on the nativity 
wage gap in two immigrant sectors in German and the UK. Further than the existing literature, we 
disentangle the impact of minimum wage regulation from other institutional features and we 
examine under which circumstances the effect occur. Additionally, we provide comparative 
evidence about distributional outcomes from a European setting.  
The findings in this article suggest considerable differences in the relative wage 
disadvantage of immigrants in German and the UK, two countries that represents two different 
social models. Descriptive statistics show that on average immigrants in the British hotel and 
restaurant industry and the German construction sector face a similar wage penalty of about 10 %. 
If we look at the entire wage distribution, differences between the British and German sector 
becomes evident, which also confirms the necessity to examine difference along the whole 
distribution. More specifically, we find that the wage gap between immigrants and natives is larger 
in Germany than in the UK except from at the bottom end of the distribution. We attribute the 
absence of a wage gap at the bottom in Germany to their strong corporate tradition where mutually 
dependent social partners set the wages for the majority of workers and the welfare state 
decommodifies the workers. This is also in line with Chiswick et al. (2008) who argues that even 
though immigrants at the bottom of the labour market tend to benefit the most from strong trade 
unions and collective bargaining, such type of wage setting impedes upwards mobility (see also 
Kogan 2007).  
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Consequently, the implementation of statutory minimum wage regulation had a different 
effect in the two sectors. In Germany, the introduction of minimum wage legislation did not affect 
the nativity wage gap, while it significantly reduced the gap at the bottom end of the wage 
distribution in the British hotel and restaurant industry. Our results therefore confirm that a national 
minimum wage can act as an instrument for reducing the problem of in-work poverty for 
immigrants and we have indications that this is particularly relevant for decentralised and liberal 
economies like the British. It indeed appears to be a way to shelter immigrants from the market 
forces as also stated by Kesler (2010). In countries where collective bargaining and a relatively 
generous welfare state has already decommodified the workers, introducing a minimum wage seem 
to be a less efficient tool for minimizing wage inequalities between immigrants and natives.  
Nevertheless, we should keep in mind that the German construction sector may represent a 
special case as wage regulation in this sector is more centralised and coordinated than in the rest of 
the economy. This is because the platform for negotiations is the national arena rather than the 
regional level. As a result, the introduction of a countrywide minimum wage in Germany (to be 
implemented in January 2015) may yield larger effects even in a corporate setting. This is also 
because the trend towards unorganised decentralisation has been increasing since the late 1990s.  
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Abstract	  	  
In 2006, the Danish government adopted the 300-hour rule, a ‘make-work-pay’ policy that targeted 
married immigrants receiving social assistance on a long-term basis. Accordingly, each spouse was 
required to work 300 hours within a two-year period. In case of non-compliance, social welfare 
workers had to enforce a permanent sanction, which resulted in a reduction in the household income 
of 18000 € yearly. This article draws on two waves of qualitative interviews with immigrant women 
and social welfare workers affected by the policy. Apart from providing insights into how a 
marginalised group copes with the potential income loss, this study also shows that when the social 
security of the families came at risk, it triggered an atmosphere of emergency among social welfare 
workers. This emergency atmosphere changed the social welfare workers’ case management and 
they found new ways to assist their clients.  
 
Keywords: Coping-behaviour, benefit sanctions, immigrants, marginalisation, social assistance, 
street-level bureaucracy.  
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1.	  Introduction	  
During recent years, the European welfare states have, to various degrees, undergone significant 
transformations (e.g. Morel et al., 2012). At the root of this transformation is the idea to ‘make-
work pay’ for the unemployed. As a result, policy makers in most countries have introduced ever-
stricter eligibility criteria often accompanied by benefit sanctions (Venn, 2012). This idea is in line 
with job search theory, which predicts that benefits reduce job search intensity and make the 
unemployed less likely to accept a job offer (Mortensen, 1977). An extensive economic literature 
supports this expectation by showing that transitions to employment increase shortly before benefit 
exhaustion or in the case of a benefit sanction (for an overview see Holmlund, 1998).  
An aspect, which has received less attention by previous studies, is the significant 
implications that ‘make work pay’ policies have for affected individuals. This is particularly the 
case for those at the margin of the labour force, but also for the social welfare workers that are 
requested to sanction their clients. This study explores the lived experiences of a Danish ‘make 
work pay’ policy introduced in spring 2006 – the so-called 300 hour rule – that mainly affected 
immigrant women receiving social assistance on a long-term basis as well as the social welfare 
workers who implemented the policy. In greater detail, social welfare workers were requested to cut 
the social assistance from clients who did not work 300 hours in non-subsidised employment during 
a two-year period. Drawing on two waves of in-depth interviews with both groups, I discover how 
the different actors experience and cope with the pressure of this policy.  
The outline of the paper is the following: next section provides insight about the Danish 
policy context and the 300-hour rule. The research approach is presented in the third section. 
Section four and five contain the findings from the two waves of interviews with the immigrant 
women and the social welfare workers that were in contiguity with the policy. The article concludes 
with a general discussion accompanied by recommendations future research.  
 
2.	  The	  300-­‐hour	  rule	  and	  the	  Danish	  policy	  context	  
At the beginning of the millennium, only about 40 % of non-western immigrant women were 
gainfully employed, as compared to 73 % of native Danish women (Regeringen, 2005). Most non-
employed immigrant women received social assistance, often on a long-term basis. Still, they had to 
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be in regular contact with the public employment agency where social welfare workers were in 
charge of monitoring labour market availability and preparing an employment strategy. If the 
employment barriers were insufficient qualifications, the women were typically requested to 
participate in active labour market programmes. Accordingly, a large proportion of the women took 
part in language courses, but also further schooling, education, or internship 
(Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2005; Geerdsen et al., 2003). If health problems were the obstacle, 
welfare workers could initiate an unravelling of the client’s case consulting the relevant experts. In 
case labour market integration was deemed unrealistic, the client had to be ‘moved’ elsewhere in 
the system (disability pension, flex-job etc.).  
 
2.1	  The	  300-­‐hour	  rule	  –	  part	  of	  a	  new	  integration	  strategy	  
The accession of the Liberal/Conservative minority government in 2001, supported by the anti-
immigration Danish People’s Party signified a change in the policy towards immigrants in 
Denmark. The new government believed that the previous integration efforts were not efficient as 
especially the married immigrant women had too few employment incentives. Particularly Muslim 
women were accused of having no real intention to work due to their traditional values: “It is to a 
great extent about culture… If I have to be completely honest then I doubt whether all immigrants 
are ready to accept a job… It may be that some of them have chosen to organise it so that the 
husband searches for a job, while the wife stays at home. One can have an opinion about it, but it is 
their choice. However, this does not mean that the public needs to finance this choice” (Hjort 
Frederiksen, 2007). This view seemed to be backed by quite a few research and consultant reports 
(e.g. LG Insight, 2004; Mogensen & Matthiessen eds., 2002; Velfærdskommissionen, 2005). 
Additionally, the government imputed the social welfare workers of shelving the cases of the 
weakest immigrant women and sometimes lumping them together in activation that did not upgrade 
their skills, but which rather functioned as ‘storage’ (Regeringen, 2005).  
In this spirit, the 300-hour rule was introduced in spring 2006. A first objective was to 
improve the economic employment incentives for immigrant women.14 For instance, a couple with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Even though the new rule in principle applied to all individuals receiving social assistance, the measure was de facto 
targeted at immigrant women from Middle-Eastern countries. The government hit their target spot on as more that 90 % 
of the covered families had immigrant background (Ankestyrelsen, 2007; Bjerregaard Bach & Larsen, 2008; Goul 
Andersen, 2007). 
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two children could lose about 1050 Euro net per month, being left with only 1329 € (Table 1). This 
is substantially below the minimum budget as defined by the Danish Council for Marginalised (The 
Danish Council for Marginalised, 2003). Regardless of definition, such families would be left in 
severe poverty.  
 
Table 1: Example of the income cut for a married couple with two children (€) 
	   Both spouses receive 
social assistance 
Discontinuation of social 
assistance for one spouse 
Social assistance 3194 1597 
 
Tax 
 
819 
	  
268	  
 
Total net income 
	  
2377 1329 
Source: Socialrådgiveren, 2007 
 
A second objective was to restrict the discretionary power of social welfare workers in order 
to make sure that the street-level bureaucrats would enforce the availability requirements in 
accordance with the law. In other words, social welfare workers were required to identify and notify 
affected social assistance recipients six months before they risked losing their benefit entitlements. 
At least one month prior to the due date, clients had to be consulted. If their client still did not 
comply with the unambiguous employment requirement, the social welfare worker had to remove 
the social assistance from one of the spouses whereas before availability requirements were blurry, 
and social welfare workers had substantial discretion to choose whether to sanction or not. This 
type of legislation can be viewed as an instrument of political control as it defines formal structures 
and procedures that later can become subject to scrutiny (McCubbins et al., 1987).  
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2.2	  The	  scope	  and	  evolution	  of	  the	  300-­‐hour	  rule	  
Not all long-term social assistance recipients were covered by the 300-hour rule, however. The new 
rules applied solely to couples living in marital union and as mentioned earlier, it was only possible 
to withdraw the social assistance from one of the spouses (Bjerregaard Bach and Larsen, 2008).15 
Furthermore, the 300-hour rule only concerned those who were able to work. Assessments were 
based on so-called ‘matching-groups’, which indicated to which extent qualifications could match 
the requirements of the labour market. When the 300-hour rule was introduced, there were five 
matching-groups (by 2010, this was reduced to three). The lowest matching-group suggests a good 
match and vice versa. Only matching-group five (and by 2010 only matching group three) was 
exempted from the new policy as they were deemed to have no labour market resources. Almost 50 
% of the affected clients belonged to matching-group four for whom ‘...only very limited job 
functions are possible’ (see also Bjerregaard Bach and Larsen, 2008; Goul Andersen, 2007). 
However, clients could be temporarily excluded during the unravelling of their case.  
The scope of the so-called 300-hour rule has also varied over the years. When it was first 
introduced and during a transition phase, social assistance recipients were requested to work at least 
150 hours in non-subsidised employment during one year. In 2008, the employment requirements 
were augmented to 450 hours, and the sanctions were extended to all married couples rather than 
jobless households only. By July 2011 the requirement was changed to 225 hours yearly, but this 
was never put into practice due to the abolishing of the scheme by the incoming centre-left 
government in September 2011 (Frederiksen, 2011). In the following, the label ‘300-hour rule’ 
applies to all variations above.   
 
3.	  Methodology	  
This study pursues a qualitative research approach in order to explore the mechanisms between 
economic incentives and the labour market orientation and integration of a group at the very margin 
of the Danish labour market. The sample is composed of social assistance recipients from non-
western countries who had received a notification from the municipality and thus risked loosing 
their benefit entitlements as well as social welfare workers who had experience with implementing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Including married couples only was with the view mainly to affect immigrant households. Because it is much more 
common for Danes to live together without being married than it is for immigrants, the proportion of immigrants 
increase if only married couples are include. 
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the 300-hour rule. Interviews were conducted during the spring/summer 2007 and in the autumn 
2010 with 24 participants (12 social assistance recipients and 12 social welfare workers). About half 
of the participants were interviewed in the first wave and among them seven were reinterviewed in 
2010 in order to explore changes over time. The individuals whom I interviewed for the first time 
during the second wave of interviews were asked to provide retrospective information when 
relevant. This article includes the experiences of 20 participants and thus information from four 
interviews is disregarded. Two interviews with social welfare workers are excluded because I 
discovered that they had very limited experience with non-western immigrants and the 300-hour 
rule in general (only one to two clients). I also ignore the experience from two interviews with 
social assistant recipients. As this study in the end focuses on problems related to the labour market 
integration of immigrant women, I do not use the information from one male participant. Another 
interview is unusable because the person thought that I was a social welfare worker who could 
provide legal and/or practical help.  
Examining the experiences of a small and stigmatised group represent certain challenges. 
For instance, the recruitment strategies often rely on informal networks rather than randomised 
samples (see also Rawsthorne, 2012). In this case, I established contacts with the immigrant women 
via different channels (contacts from social welfare workers, networks and immigrant 
organizations).16 As for the social welfare workers, I contacted senior public servants at 
municipality level who could direct me to the colleague(s) who had the most experience with the 
300 hour rule. Information about individual identity and municipality is not disclosed in order to 
ensure participation and facilitate honest answers.  
All interviews are semi-structured and used to document participants’ shared experiences 
and opinions about the 300-hour rule. Interviews are framed around a few general questions. The 
framework of questions is based on a telephone inquiry among all Danish municipalities conducted 
in April 2007 and conversations with representatives from immigrant organizations. During these 
talks, I obtained an overview of the mechanisms triggered by the 300-hour rule. I thereafter started 
conducting interviews. The first interviews were rather unstructured in order to discover the field in 
greater detail, while the last became more focused. Rather than transcribing interviews in full 
length, I wrote out important parts and took additional notes. In the end, I produced a summary of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 One interview was conducted by Muller, Andersen, Ejrnæs & Larsen (2010). 
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each interview, which was sent to respondents in order to obtain their approval.17 The quotes in the 
text have been selected with the purpose to support a specific argument and thus I do not claim that 
they represent the views of all interviewees (see also Rawsthorne, 2012). Note also that the quotes 
are translated with possible mistakes, underlining the women’s poor language proficiency.  
 
4.	  Participants	  
The social assistant recipients are all Muslim women from non-western countries. With the 
exception of one, everyone arrived as refugees/asylum seekers or as relatives hereof. They are 25-
50 years old and had two to five children below 18 years at the time of the first interview. The 
sampled women represent various profiles with respect to how they were affected by the legislation, 
their educational level, ethnic group, and level of integration into the Danish society (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Profiles of the interviewed immigrant women 
  W1 W2 W3 W418 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 
Origin Somal. Somal. Somal. Maroc. Iran Afghan. Afghan. Afghan. Leban. Leban. 
Arrival year 1996 1996 1996 1978 1998 2002 2001 2001 1990 1985 
Head scarf  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
Children 
(below 18) 
5 5 4 2 3 4 2 4 3 2 
Educational 
level (country 
of origin) 
Medical 
laboratory 
ass. 
None Primary 
school 
- High 
school 
None Primary 
school 
Started 
teacher 
training 
English at 
university 
(2 years) 
NA 
Lab. exp. from 
country of 
origin   
8 years  None None None None None None None None NA 
Danish 
qualifications 
DLC* + 
activation 
DLC DLC DLC + 
activation 
DLC + 
activation 
DLC DLC + 
activation 
DLC + 
activation 
DLC + 
activation 
Health 
care sec. 
Danish labour 
market exp. 
None None None Yes None None None None None Yes 
Activity when 
the 300 hour 
rule was 
DLC DLC DLC Activation DLC DLC Seeking 
jobs 
9th grade at 
VUC** 
9th grade at 
VUC 
Seeking 
jobs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 There were a few that I could not regain contact with due a move, change of phone number or job. 
18 I obtained the interview with W4 from Center for Alternativ Samfundsanalyse (CASA) who conducted the interview 
as part of a study about families receiving the lowest level of welfare (see also Muller et al., 2010). 
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introduced 
Translator 
needed 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 
*Danish Language Courses **Adult Educational Centre 
 
Eight of the social welfare workers had direct contact with clients in a position as 
employment agents (from the job centres) or social workers (from the social centre in charge of the 
payment of benefits). Two had a managerial position where they, among other things, had to 
organise the overall implementation of the 300-hour rule and listen to the concerns of their 
subordinates. The interviewed social welfare workers had different views on the 300-hour rule, but 
in accordance with the prevailing opinion, most interviewees were rather critical towards the new 
rules (see also the hearing statement from the Danish Social Welfare Worker’s Association: 
Arbejdsmarkedsudvalget, Udvalget for Udlændinge- og Integrations, 2005). Still, the majority 
sympathised with certain elements, in particular the goal of labour market integration. 
 
Table 3: Social welfare workers 
 
 
 
SWW1 
 
SWW2 
 
SWW3 
 
SWW4 
 
SWW5 
 
SWW6 
 
SWW7 
 
SWW8 
 
SWW9 
 
SWW10 
Gender female Female female male Male Male female male female male 
Age 40+ No No Yes Yes No Yes - No - Yes 
Position Social 
centre 
Social 
centre 
Empl. 
agency 
Empl. 
agency 
Team 
leader 
Empl. 
agency 
Empl. 
agency 
Team 
leader 
Head of 
empl. 
project 
Social 
centre 
 
	  
5.	  The	  300	  hour	  rule	  and	  the	  immigrant	  women	  
5.1	  Economic	  incentives	  -­‐	  short-­‐term	  versus	  long-­‐term	  employment	  plans	  
One of the key themes that emerged from the interviews with the immigrant women relates to short-
term versus long-term employment motivation. It was very important for most women to convince 
me that they did not strive to be housewives, but were committed to participate on the labour 
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market even prior to the 300-hour rule. One of the Somali women expressed herself in quite definite 
terms: ‘There are nobody who wants to stay at home, but Danes think that we want to stay at home 
and that is not true’ (W2). She appeared to be somewhat offended by this prejudice, which she felt 
from the surrounding society.  
Paradoxically, the majority of women acknowledged that they were not actively job seeking 
at the time of the introduction of the 300-hour rule. This could indicate that I was given the 
politically correct answer. Nevertheless, one circumstance speaks against such an interpretation, 
namely that everybody participated in courses or further schooling and thus they were not merely 
housewives (see Table 2).19 Subsequently, a few intended to work right away, while the rest aspired 
to continue their education (as pedagogues, nurses, social and health care worker). The wish for 
further schooling/education was particularly strong for some women. Two of them had allegedly 
been offered ‘passive benefits’ prior to the 300-hour rule, but instead they chose to study: ‘I went to 
VUC [Adult Educational Centre]. I will not like to stay at home’ (W9) and W5 said: ‘...when I was 
at home, I am bored’. Several of the women had become rather discourage in their job search 
because they were always asked about a Danish degree. The Danish schooling/education was 
therefore not only regarded as an activity that could fill their days, but also an ‘admission ticket’ 
that could pave the way for long-term labour market integration.  
Despite of this, the interviews leave little doubt that the increased economic incentives from 
the 300-hour rule had changed their employment focus from being a distant future plan to an urgent 
matter. Consequently, and in line with job search theory (Mortensen, 1977; Holmlund, 1998), all 
interviewed women engaged in active job search including the consultation of a wider range of job 
search channels: ‘...well, it is obvious of course that when you get penalised financially, then one of 
course try to mobilise all the – what is it called – creativity one can and I have of course... made a 
greater effort to search’ (W1). This process was extremely stressful for all the interviewed women 
(see further discussion below) and it also appeared to have had spill-over effects on the social 
welfare workers, who reported that their clients became more insisting. For instance SWW3 
explained how her clients all of a certain begin to call her or show up at her office asking for extra 
help to find a job. This suggests that the pressure from affected clients became stronger (see further 
discussion in section 6).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The findings of previous studies also indicate that most immigrant women with to participate actively on the labour 
market (Bjerregaard Bach and Larsen, 2008; Christensen and Goul Andersen, 2006; Goul Andersen, 2008). 
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Job search theory also predicts that acceptance of a job depends on whether the wage offer 
exceeds the reservation wage. Accordingly, the reservation wage is assumed to increase with 
benefit generosity (Mortensen, 1977; Holmlund, 1998). The interviews with the immigrant women 
also bore witness to this. Some women worked the required number of hours before the due date 
(W7 and W8). Others lost their benefit entitlements, but it turned out during the second interview 
round that most had managed to find a job relatively shortly thereafter (in cleaning, at warehouses 
or factories, doing the dishes in a restaurants). These were not the jobs they had dreamed of (all 
preferred to take care of children and old people), not only due to the content of the work, but also 
because it was unstable, casual jobs and sometimes physically demanding.20 Nevertheless, the 
women felt they had to accept these jobs due to the economic pressure: ‘...it is also an annoying 
job, cleaning... but I have to work. So I would [have] like [d] education first...’ (W8).   
 
5.2	  Dilemmas	  about	  how	  to	  reconcile	  work	  with	  traditions	  and	  family	  needs	  
Although the 300 hour rule made most of the women willing to compromise their individual 
ambitions (and at least three of the women put an end to further studies), more than half of them 
voiced certain difficulties concerning jobs that did not comply with their traditional values 
including religion.21 Those who wore a headscarf refused to take it off: ‘I do not feel like taking my 
religion away because of work...’ (W7). Some women also have similar concerns about jobs where 
they would be in direct contact with pork meat and alcohol. 
Quandary related to the well being of their families was also high on their agenda. On the 
one hand, many conveyed the importance of being present in the home during the early mornings 
and evenings/nights. For instance, W10 appeared to believe that she would fail her responsibility as 
a bad mother if she worked during the evening: ‘… [e]vening job, that is somewhat difficult for me, 
it is my children. There, I draw the line. Even though they say that you need to do everything to find 
a job then I still feel that way – I would rather be with my children during the evenings… If I need 
to find an evening job then the upbringing of my children would be lost…’ (W10). In general, their 
hesitation seemed more related to traditional family values than the availability of public childcare 
(as public childcare is nearly always available during the day, c.f. Goul Andersen, 2007). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Only W6 had remained in the same job since 2007 and it was in her husband’s pizzeria. 
21 Consistent with the findings of previous studies, the women disclosed rather conservative values (see also Ministeriet 
for Flygtninge, Invandrere og Integration, 2007). 
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Furthermore, in most cases the husband was at home during the evenings. On the other hand, the 
women were extremely worried about not being able to full-fill the most basic physical and social 
needs of their children if they did not find a job. For instance W3 explained the consequences for 
her family and her feelings when she lost her benefit entitlements: ‘Less clothes because you do not 
have the means to buy clothes for them [her children]. It also concerns the food, which means less 
food. It is very difficult. It is something that I cannot describe. It is a very difficult situation. And 
then the worst is when the winter comes and then they need waterproofed suits and winter clothes 
and winter boots and that we cannot afford’ (see further discussion below).  
Among the women who had expressed such concerns, none of them thought that traditional 
values were incompatible with their active labour market participation, however. Even if, some of 
the Somali women implicitly acknowledge that their way of dressing represented a barrier, they did 
not seem to feel responsibly themselves, but blamed the employers for their situation: ‘There is no 
one that opens the door to the labour market… “Why not?” [rhetorical question from the 
interviewee] They [the employers] don’t want us.’ (W2). It appeared to be easier for some of the 
other women to reconcile work and traditions possibly also because their families were flexible. For 
instance W8’s husband came to pick her up from work (60 km in total) due to lack of public 
transport during the evenings and he also started helping with the house chores (still, she prepared 
the dinners for the week during weekends). W6 and her family had different priorities. Even if her 
husband was at home and they risked being sanctioned, it was important that she was present during 
the early mornings: ‘...it is difficult for me... I not go early in the morning because I have two small 
children’. Consequently, her husband found a job at a fish factory and she took over his job in the 
pizzeria during the late morning and afternoon. The husband then kept his duties in the pizzeria 
during the evenings. In other words, the increased economic incentives did not appear to have 
‘moved’ the interviewed women with respect to their traditional way of life, but some were just 
more able to find solutions where they felt able to satisfy both requirements.  
 
5.3	   Side	   effects:	   declining	   well-­‐being	   and	   mistrust	   towards	   the	   Danish	   society	   and	   the	   social	  
welfare	  system	  
It is clear from the interviews with the immigrant women as well as the social welfare workers that 
the 300-hour rule gave rise to certain side effects. First of all, the new rules caused much distress 
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and worries for the affected women. They experienced fits of depression, sleep deprivation, lack of 
energy, concentration difficulties etc. W3 explained her feelings in the following way: ‘I got very 
confused, sad - could not deal mentally with this regulation’. This was because she felt completely 
helpless, as she did not ‘...know the system and I do not know, which door I should ring the bell and 
I have no experience and then I do not know what I [should] do’. The distress and worries was even 
sometimes visible in their physical appearance. For instance W5 was almost crying during the first 
interview and looked truly depressed.22 This stood in stark contrast with the impression I had from 
the second interview where she, despite of the 300 hour rule, had finished an education as a social 
and health care worker and found a good and stable job. Here she now appeared to be a happy and 
dynamic young woman. She told me about her everyday life with family and friends and even asked 
me what I had been doing during the intervening years. This showed a surplus of mental resources, 
which she did not possess during the first interview.  
Nevertheless, the distress became even worse for the sanctioned families who faced 
problems paying the rent, basic groceries, clothes for the children and therefore had to borrow 
money from friends and family. For instance W10 told me that: ‘So we cannot continue to go and 
borrow money… and in the end it gets too much for yourself… you will be embarrassed and 
irritated that you go and beg for money and that is hard’.23 Also the social welfare workers 
observed their frustrations. SWW9 reported that some of her clients were so consumed with worries 
that it was difficult to have a normal conversation with them. These findings are consistent with the 
‘coping perspective’ (Halvorsen, 1994; Goul Andersen, 2002), which suggests that such mental 
conditions can occur because the individual’s ability to cope with unemployment is largely 
determined by access to economic resources (see also Ervasti and Venetoklis, 2010; Fryer, 1986; 
Goul Andersen, 2002; Halvorsen, 1994; Leana and Feldman, 1990; Nordenmark and Strandh, 1998; 
Whelan, 1992).  
Next to the practical economic worries was the guilt towards their families, especially the 
children. Most women tried to shelter the children from the concrete worries, but it was not always 
possible. For instance, W10 told me that her worries affected her family: ‘You really get so stressed 
that I took it out on the family. I took it out on my husband and my two small children – that was not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 When SWW3 provided the contact on W5 (after having the permission from her client) she warns me that ‘She [W5] 
feels like hell…’ due to the pressure of the 300 hour rule. Consequently, SWW3 did not expect that W5 would have 
much energy for the interview.    
23 W10 tends to talk in second person about herself.  
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really particularly right… It [the 300 hour rule] has hit us hard’. It was also very difficult to cope 
with the fact that they could not afford to let their children participate in social activities or buy 
certain things. For example, W5 told me that she had to tell her daughter that she might not be able 
to continue playing handball, which was very difficult for her: ‘So then I have really bad conscience 
towards my children. Therefore, I put pressure on myself to find a piece to work, but I could not 
continue’. The financial worries also sometimes took its toll on the marital union: ‘...stress and lack 
of money that can of course cause problems at home between the husband and the wife’ (W10) (see 
also Conger et al., 1990).  
A second side-effect was that the interviewed women generally felt singled out and 
somewhat excluded from the Danish society due to this policy. They knew that it was designed to 
affect immigrant families: ‘They [the politicians] want to affect Muslims, that’s it’ (W2). It also 
planted a mistrust and discontent towards the Danish social welfare system. Because the 
participants in their opinion already had demonstrated a will to integrate by actively engaging in 
further courses/schooling/education, it was difficult for them to understand and accept the new rule 
rules. Despite of the fact that all women felt the 300 hour rule unfair in their situation, quite a few 
of them also showed considerable understanding for the policy for those that in their opinion just 
sponged off the state. For instance W6 explained that: ‘For other people, it [the 300 hour rule] is 
good… They sit at home and drink and eat – not good’ (W6). A few women were also very bitter on 
their social welfare worker. For instance W5 thought that she was not shown enough flexibility and 
compassion for her situation: ‘It is very unfair so close to the exam [Danish language exam], then 
they pressure [the social welfare workers] me to work’. Instead she had told her social welfare work 
not to generalise: ‘… [y]ou should also consider my situation, you should not genera, generalise 
everything. There are differences from one person to another person’.  
	  
6.	  Cross-­‐pressure	  and	  break	  with	  coping-­‐behaviour	  
This view on the social welfare workers’ implementation stands in stark contrast to my 
observations. The interviews with the social welfare workers showed that most felt the deepest 
sympathy towards the families who sometimes desperately asked for their help. This treatment of 
the very weakest was at odds with the social welfare workers’ professional values and thus they did 
not only experience an increasing pressure from their clients, but also from within. Most of the 
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interviewed social welfare workers were convinced that the main problem was not their clients’ 
unwillingness to work, but rather employment barriers that were beyond their control (see also the 
hearing statement from the Danish Social Welfare Worker’s Association: Arbejdsmarkedsudvalget, 
Udvalget for Udlændinge- og Integrations, 2005). The same social welfare worker whom W5 
expressed a very negative opinion about (see Section 5, pp. 19) specifically told me that W5 was 
one of the clients whom she felt great scruples towards: ‘Ohh, it is a pity… She is a girl who I think 
slogs away… Damn, I think it is a pity for somebody like her’ (SWW3). Others were so frustrated 
that it affected their psychological well-being: ‘God help me, I was ill myself last week for three 
days because I cracked up’ (SWW10) and another said: ‘It is awful every time [to inform a client 
that (s)he will be sanctioned] – it is something that makes me lie awake at night’ (SWW4). 
Nevertheless, they felt that they were left with no choice, because as also indicated in Section 2, the 
300-hour rule can be viewed as an instrument of political control and therefore a growing pressure 
from above. To underpin this, the social welfare workers seemed surprisingly conscientious 
regarding the enforcement of the 300-hour rule: ‘I definitely have clients where I sit and feel really 
sorry for them, but I also still have a legislation that I have to relate to and I need to act upon’ 
(SWW2). 
 
6.1	  Emergency	  atmosphere	  and	  a	  break	  with	  coping-­‐behaviour	  
As a consequence of the increasing cross-pressure, an atmosphere of emergency arose among social 
welfare workers. According to Lipsky (1980), emergency procedures tend to induce a more 
comprehensive treatment of the clients in question when limited resources otherwise prevent them 
from treating all cases sufficiently. In other words, ‘assigning’ clients to a so-called emergency 
category implicitly bring further resources for solving these cases. 
The mobilisation of resources happened primarily at the level of the individual social 
welfare worker. SWW3 stated the following about her considerations: ‘We... relatively quickly 
schedule them for a meeting [to see] whether we can as soon as possible help them … find 
something [a job]’. She further explained: ‘…so there we have actually made those [clients] a 
priority’. According to SWW5, this was also partly facilitated by a mobilisation that took place at 
the municipal level (both at administrative and political level) and helped along by the extra funds 
granted from the central government to selected municipalities (see also Rambol, 2009). 
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Noticeably, several social welfare workers reported that their caseload declined dramatically. For 
instance SWW9 explained that when she was assigned to lead a project, which specifically focused 
on women covered by the 300 hour rule, her caseload dropped to 1/6 of the cases she normally 
managed.  
All in all, the mobilisation of resources among social welfare workers, partly supported by 
the extra resources from local and central governments, appeared to have contributed to a break 
with the widespread use of coping-behaviour towards this group (see also see also Heinesen, 
Winter, Risom & Husted, 2004; LG Insight, 2004, 2005; Regeringen, 2005; Winter, 2002). Even 
though these clients were considered as difficult cases they were assigned greater priority (a break 
with the coping option, creaming). The increased attention also resulted in greater awareness of the 
individual differences within the group and thus a break with standardization (for further discussion 
see Lipsky, 1980). Previously: ‘...they had been somewhere there in that ‘grey crowd’ that 
somehow was on standby’ as SWW6 vividly described it. 
 
6.2	  Social	  welfare	  workers	  –	  from	  barrier	  to	  helping	  hand	  
The break with coping-behaviour implied that social welfare workers became a ‘helping hand’ 
rather than a ‘barrier’. From almost ignoring non-western women who had received social 
assistance on a long-term basis, several social welfare workers and municipalities now introduced 
different measures that should foster their labour market integration. One type of measure was to 
allocate extra resources to the communication of the 300-hour so that the notification letter would 
not stand alone. Many municipalities invited affected families for information meetings with the 
participation of translators, while in others, client were called extraordinary for individual meetings. 
Another type of measures sought to provide extra job-search assistance (e.g. extra close 
supervision, increased availability, direct contact with employers). Municipalities and not least 
individual social welfare workers went well beyond the service traditionally expected. Some 
explicitly asked employers to provide job openings putting additional pressure on them by 
explaining the consequences for the sanctioned families. One social welfare worker stated that 
when an employer refused to hire one of his clients, he immediately asked what could be done to 
change his mind (mentor programme, Danish courses etc.). There are also municipalities that 
implemented different employment programmes (e.g. ‘job-clubs’, mentor schemes). In order to 
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provide an extra helping hand, some municipalities reorganised their integration efforts by creating 
special units or assigning a key person to these clients (e.g. in the case of SWW9’s municipality). 
This possibly gave rise to further specialisation. 
 
6.3	  Tidying	  up	  
The increased attention towards the individual as well as the liberation of resources also resulted in 
a large scale tidying up. Several social welfare workers reported that they were behind with the 
unravelling of these clients’ cases because it was a non-obligatory task (also a coping option). This 
appears to have been a matter of economic calculations. SWW3 explained that ‘contact-meetings’ 
were previously given priority because of the subsidy rules. Besides it was often very time 
consuming to unravel some of these cases. According to SWW9, this was because some clients did 
not dare to go alone to for instance medical examinations. Due to the dramatic decrease in her 
caseload, she was now able to pick the client up and take her to the hospital. Quite a few social 
welfare workers reported that many clients where either temporarily exempted from the 300-hour 
rule or permanently moved elsewhere in the social welfare system (e.g. disability pension, assigned 
to matching-group five, flex-job). This tidying up (to the extent that it was rightful) can therefore 
also be viewed as a break with past coping-behaviour. 
It is of course difficult to judge whether it always was legitimate or if it sometimes was to 
protect a client. However, despite being anonymous, social welfare workers deny that non-
professional considerations underlie their decisions. Nevertheless, in a few occasions I suspect that 
it was not only a matter of tidying up as my question made some of the social welfare workers very 
uncomfortable. As an example, SWW1 told me that their team leader had inculcated that it was not 
acceptable if they just moved clients to matching-group five, but she admitted: ‘...whether a few 
slipped thaaaat I neither confirm nor refute - it is a dangerous question you are asking me’. Others 
confess that it was decided that nobody in their municipality should be sanctioned. 
However, the 300-hour rule appeared to have affected the decision whether to unravel or not 
(also called ‘create resource profiles’ in technical terms). SWW3 stated that ‘…when the situation… 
is that if you do not do it [create a resource profile] then they are kicked out [of the social assistance 
system] and that you can see that it will be horrible then you start up more resource profiles, I 
believe’. She further expounded that problems, which were previously disregarded now played a 
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role (e.g. people who were traumatized, who had back pain etc.). Due to the severe economic 
consequences several social welfare workers also mentioned the importance of safeguarding the 
legal rights of their clients. 
 
7.	  Discussion	  	  	  
During the last decade, policy makers in most developed welfare states have introduced ever stricter 
eligibility criteria combined with benefit sanctions in order to ‘make work pay’. The aim of this 
study was to contribute to the literature with a better understanding of how such initiatives may 
influence the mechanisms that are important for the labour market orientation and integration of 
individuals with poor labour market prospects. This was done by exploring the lived experiences of 
a Danish policy change – the so-called 300-hour rule – that dramatically increased the economic 
incentives to work for immigrant women receiving social assistance on a long-term basis. The 
intension from the Liberal/Conservative government was to force these women to participate 
actively on the labour market and break with their traditional values.    
My findings suggest that the harsh economic incentives indeed did stimulate the short-term 
employment motivation of the affected women, which in turn resulted in increased job search 
intensity and their willingness to accept a job offer. Nonetheless, the women did not seem to think 
that traditional values hampered their labour market integration, as these different considerations – 
in their view – were not incompatible in the first place. However, in actual practice this balancing 
act appears to have been easier for women and families who were flexible.   
Nevertheless, this is only part of the picture. The interviews also draw our attention to the 
potential negative consequences of strong economic incentives, especially for those who felt unable 
to meet the employment request. Many women did not only suffer psychologically (they 
experienced fits of depression, sleep deprivation, lack of surplus of energy), but some also gave up 
further education and lost contact with the social welfare system as a result of the 300-hour rule. 
Therefore, my findings indicate that the 300-hour rule deprived the women from some of the 
positive effects of benefits, namely that financial means can prevent the decline in psychological 
well-being and implicitly facilitate support from the social welfare system.24 In other words, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 As benefit recipiency in Denmark goes hand in hand with monitoring as well as assistance from the social welfare 
system.  
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benefits also represent a potentially important personal resource, most likely particularly crucial for 
the unemployed who have poor labour market prospects. The contact and assistance from the social 
welfare system may be even more important for immigrant job seekers as it is a way for them to 
obtain host country specific human capital (e.g. language course, internships, education etc.) and 
knowledge about the labour market. These were also opportunities, which the women generally 
valued. It is therefore unfortunate that the 300-hour rule planted (or reinforced) a feeling of 
resentment towards the Danish society and social welfare system.  
With regard to the social welfare workers, the government’s hopes were partly fulfilled, but 
the way it happened was not exactly in the spirit of the policy makers. In greater detail, witnessing 
their client’s despair, an atmosphere of emergency transpired among social welfare workers. This 
situation gave rise to a break with the coping-behaviour of the past. Now, these clients were made a 
priority. Efforts to support their chances of finding a job often went way beyond what is normally 
expected. In some municipalities, extra resources granted by the central government also facilitated 
this. Finally, the increased attention gave rise to ‘tidying up’ in the municipalities as well. Thus 
several immigrant women were moved elsewhere in the social welfare system and thereby 
exempted from the sanctions.  
This study reminds us that we should not only consider the mechanisms stated by job search 
theory. Future quantitative research should account for some of these positive effects of benefits, 
particularly for those with poor employment prospects. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind 
that sometimes it is not only the target group, which is affect by a policy, but also the street-level 
bureaucrats who are implementing the legislation. A combination of high quality administrative 
data and a survey at the level of social welfare workers or municipalities could facilitate this 
research. 
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Abstract	  
In spring 2006, the Danish government introduced a policy that required married long-term social 
assistance recipients to work 300 hours in non-subsidised employment during a two-year period in 
order to remain eligible for benefits. The intention was to ‘make work pay’ for unemployed 
immigrant women. This study evaluates how this policy influenced their transitions to employment 
and other benefit schemes by applying a competing risk duration model on Danish administrative 
data. The results show that the new rules not only had the anticipated impact on the women 
concerned, but the policy also had an unforeseen effect on the work effort of social welfare 
workers. Many moved their clients to other benefit schemes instead of applying the sanctions. This 
was particularly the case for the weakest among the unemployed and in municipalities, which were 
headed by left-wing mayors or that received extra funds from the central government. Although the 
new policy did increase transitions to employment, this effect occurred mainly in municipalities that 
provided extra support. 
 
Keywords: Benefit sanctions, even history analysis, immigrants, social assistance, street level 
bureaucracy, unemployment duration  
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1. Introduction	  
There is a long and ongoing debate about the sustainability of European welfare states. The 
previously acclaimed goal of decommodification and poverty reduction has been superseded by a 
more critical view on the welfare state. Generous social protection has been blamed for the increase 
in the proportion of individuals from the working age population who do not participate actively on 
the labour market (e.g. OECD, 1999). As a result, governments in most European countries have 
introduced stricter conditions for benefits in order to 'make work pay' (OECD, 1998; 1999; Venn, 
2012; for a conceptual discussion see Clasen and Clegg, 2007). One clear example of this trend is 
so-called ‘activation policies’; unemployed benefit recipients are requested to fulfil set criteria to 
demonstrate their availability for work. In some extreme cases, non-compliance can result in the 
complete removal of benefits (e.g. Clasen and Clegg, 2008; Lødemel and Trickey, 2001; Barbier 
and Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004). But are such sanctions always effective?   
An extensive economic literature investigates the impact of benefit sanctions and finds a 
positive effect on transitions to employment (e.g. Lalive et al., 2005; Van den Berg, 2004. For 
overviews see Holmlund, 1998). However, most scholarly proponents of this view place less 
emphasis on three important aspects:  
Firstly, other than the actual impact of benefit removal (the ex-post effect), the mere threat 
of being sanctioned is also likely to influence the behaviour of the unemployed (the ex-ante effect). 
The vast majority focuses solely on the former effect. A notable exception is Lalive et al. (2005) 
who study the ex-ante effect by including variations in sanctioning regimes among different regions 
in Switzerland. Their findings suggest that relatively strict monitoring along with sanctions has a 
positive effect on transitions to employment (see also Jensen et al., 2003).  
Secondly, as job search theory implicitly assumes employers are willing and able to hire, 
most previous research studies the impact of benefit sanctions on 'employable' individuals. But what 
happens when strong economic incentives are targeted towards the very weakest? Are sanctions 
really an efficient tool for increasing the labour supply of those at the margins of the labour market? 
It is possible to imagine that the impact of benefit sanctions (both ex-ante and ex-post) on this group 
might be neutralised by employment barriers and result in poor job matches or even lead to some 
people leaving the labour market (see also Rosholm and Vejlin, 2010). This knowledge gap is of 
particular concern since policy makers increasingly direct strong economic incentives towards 
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social assistance recipients, immigrants, disabled people and other groups at the margin of the 
labour market (Denmark: Goul Andersen, 2007; the UK: Adam and Brown, 2013). 	  
Thirdly, to the best of my knowledge, the literature considers the direct effects of benefit 
sanctions on the supply side as identified by job search theory, but ignores other mechanisms. 
Bearing in mind that street-level bureaucrats implement most labour market policies, there could be 
an intermediate effect of a strict monitoring regime with benefit sanctions on their case 
management or social welfare workers could simply 'choose' to diverge from the intentions behind 
the law, the principal-agent problem (see also Lipsky, 1980; Clasen and Clegg, 2007). A recent 
qualitative study of a Danish policy change, namely the so-called 300 hour rule, provides an 
example of such a mechanism. This policy combined strict employment conditions with close 
monitoring of long-term social assistance recipients in order to 'make work pay' (Diop-Christensen, 
2012). Non-compliance was punished by a complete loss of entitlements to social assistance. 
According to Diop-Christensen (2012), the 300-hour rule not only triggered changes for social 
assistance recipients, it also influenced the work efforts and priorities of social welfare workers. As 
a way to ‘shelter’ their clients from the severe consequences of the policy, some social welfare 
workers increased their job search assistance, while others moved certain individuals to other 
benefit schemes (e.g. disability pension, sheltered employment). Ultimately, such actions may even 
have influenced the unemployment duration and the exit state of the effected group (see further 
discussion in Section 2). 
Following this, the aim of the present study is to increase our understanding of the impact of 
benefit sanctions for groups at the very margin of the labour market, while considering mechanisms 
related to social welfare workers and the ex-ante effect. More specifically, this paper examines the 
impact of the aforementioned 300-hour rule on transitions from unemployment for the target group, 
namely non-western women receiving social assistance on a long-term basis. The paper adopts a 
multi-level competing risk duration model. The three possible exits from unemployment are long-
term employment, short-term employment or other benefit schemes. The last option includes 
transitions to disability pension, different types of sheltered employment, and another category of 
the social assistance scheme where recipients are not required to be available for work. The paper 
uses Danish administrative data combined with variables at the municipality level.  
This research therefore contributes to the existing literature in three ways: Firstly, rather 
than merely focusing on the ex-post effect of benefit sanctions, it also identifies ex-ante effects by 
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including a proxy for exposure to the new sanctioning regime. Following the argument of Van den 
Berg et al. (2004), the ex-ante effect of a system with certain sanctions can be identified if data is 
also available  “...from a period with a welfare system without sanctions” (pp. 239). The 
introduction of the 300-hour rule provides such a set-up (see further discussion in Section 2). 
Secondly, the analysis enhances our knowledge about whether the theoretical predictions from job 
search theory are applicable to the ‘unemployable’ and if this group is at greater risk of finding 
unstable employment and exiting from the regular labour market as a result of the strong economic 
incentives. Other than examining the effect of sanctions on a group at the very margin of the Danish 
labour force, I include a proxy for the degree of ‘employability’, which is available in the Danish 
administrative data. Thirdly, by including variables at municipality level, this paper also examines 
the potential intermediate impact of a benefit-sanctioning regime on social welfare workers as 
suggested by Diop-Christensen (2012). Furthermore, because transitions to other benefit schemes 
can only be undertaken on the initiative of a social welfare worker, including other benefit schemes 
as a possible exit state from unemployment it also captures this intermediate impact.  
The outline of the paper is as follows: The next section provides further information about 
the 300-hour rule and the Danish policy context. Based on this, five hypotheses are presented. Data 
and methodology are outlined in Section Three. Section Four contains the results. This section 
provides some descriptive statistics and figures on the hazard rate from unemployment before 
considering the results from the competing-risks event-history models. The conclusion in the final 
section is accompanied by recommendations for policy and future research. 
 
2. The	  300-­‐hour	  rule	  and	  the	  Danish	  policy	  context	  
At the beginning of the millennium, only about 40 % of non-western immigrant women were 
gainfully employed compared with 73 % of native Danish women. Most non-employed immigrant 
women received social assistance on a long-term basis. According to the Liberal-Conservative 
minority government of the time, the main reason for the poor labour market outcomes of these 
women was the lack of economic employment incentives. Having an economic incentive to find a 
job was assumed to be even more important for immigrant women than for native Danes due to the 
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prevalence of traditional family values, as most of them originated from the Greater Middle East 
(Regeringen, 2005, Hjort Frederiksen, 2007).25  
However, the government did not only blame the immigrant women for a failure – or 
inability – to participate in the labour market, but also the social welfare workers whom allegedly 
did not enforce the principle of labour market availability as a condition for benefit receipt. In other 
words, this group had been shelved by social welfare workers and thus exempted from the 
employment requirements (Regeringen, 2005). This claim was supported by previous studies and 
policy reports, which concluded that non-western immigrant women were generally subject to 
social welfare workers' coping–behaviour (Heinesen et al., 2004; LG Insight, 2004; Winter, 2002; 
see also Lipsky, 1980).26  
In response, the government introduced the 300-hour rule in spring 2006. This policy was 
part of the integration package ‘A New Chance for All’, which was supported by the right-wing, 
Danish People's party. The explicit intention was to make work pay for immigrant women and they 
hit their target spot on as more than 90 % of the covered families had immigrant background 
(Bjerregaard Bach and Larsen, 2008).   
 
2.1 The	  300-­‐hour	  rule	  –	  scope	  and	  consequences	  for	  social	  assistance	  recipients	  
The 300-hour rule required individuals, living in a marital union, to work for 300 hours in non-
subsidised employment during a 2-year period in order to remain eligible for social assistance. In 
the case of non-compliance, one of the spouses would lose benefit entitlements. During a transition 
phase (from 2006 to April 2008), the government ‘only’ required 150 hours’ employment over a 
12-month period. Local authorities had to notify potentially affected families by letter six months 
before sanctions would kick in (starting from October 2006). In the narrowest interpretation of the 
law, the spouses could choose to work a few hours every week or take on a full-time job lasting 
between one and two months. This would grant them the right to receive social assistance for the 
following two years.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 I follow the definition of the Greater Middle East by the G8, which also includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North 
Africa. 
26 Such a prioritisation is common among street–level bureaucrats, who tend to make difficult cases that demands extra 
resources subject to their coping behaviour (Lipsky, 1980). 
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In cases where the employment request was not fulfilled one month prior to the due date, 
consultative procedures were initiated by social welfare workers to establish a possible 
postponement of the initial sanction date because periods of maternity leave or illness did not count. 
Nevertheless, only one spouse could lose social assistance entitlements. For a family of four, this 
would result in a monthly decrease in household income of about € 1,050 (see Table 1 below). 
However, the sanctioned spouse could re-qualify for social assistance by working 300 hours from 
the first sanction date. Any hours worked prior to the date of sanctioning were disregarded.  
In line with the expectations of the government, the strong economic sanctions should foster 
the labour market integration of these non-western immigrant women. In greater detail, the threat of 
losing benefit entitlements (ex-ante effect) as well as the actual sanction (ex-post effect) is expected 
to increase transitions to employment (Hypothesis 1).  
 
Table 1: Example of the income cut for a married couple with two children (€) 
 Both spouses receive social 
assistance 
Discontinuation of social 
assistance for one spouse 
Social assistance 3194 1597 
Tax 819 268 
Total net income 2377 1329 
Source: Rasmussen, 2007 
 
However, not all married couples were subject to the new monitoring and sanctioning 
regime – those without any ability to work were exempted. Assessments were based on so-called 
‘matching-groups’, that indicate whether qualifications matched labour market requirements. At 
that time, there were five matching-groups. The first of these suggested a good match and vice 
versa. Only matching-group five was excluded. The inclusion of those who belonged to matching-
group four (almost 50 % of the affected clients) was viewed as particularly controversial as the 
unemployed in this category “...have such significant limitations in their competences and 
resources that the unemployed would not immediately be able to attend to job functions on the 
regular labour market” (see also Bjerregaard Bach and Larsen, 2008; Goul Andersen, 2007). Due 
to the poor labour market prospects for individuals belonging to the lowest matching categories, I 
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would expect that the ex-ante and ex-post effects on transition to employment would be smaller for 
individuals from matching group 3 and 4, and that they would be more concerned by transitions to 
unstable jobs than those from matching groups 1 and 2 (Hypothesis 2). 
 
2.2 Consequences	  and	  options	  for	  social	  welfare	  workers	  
The 300-hour rule intended to make sure that social welfare workers applied a strict monitoring 
regime to non-western immigrant women so they were not exempted from the labour market 
availability requirement. This was ensured by the definition of clear and indispensable standards for 
labour market availability and sanctions whereas before, the availability requirement was blurry and 
the punitive measures were based on  discretionary assessment by social welfare workers.  
According to McCubbins et al. (1987), such legislation increases political control. This 
argument is supported by Diop-Christensen (2012) who observed that social welfare workers felt an 
increasing pressure from the top. At the same time, she suggests that pressure from below and from 
within the social welfare workers also increased. In greater detail, the pressure from within 
intensified because the policy was at odds with the professional standards of social welfare workers. 
As evident from the hearing statement from the Danish Social Welfare Workers' Association 
(Dansk Socialrådgiverforening), the organisation disagreed with the effectiveness of the policy 
instrument, which in their view would only lead to increasing marginalisation.27 The social welfare 
workers also felt a greater pressure from below – their clients – who suddenly found themselves in 
an extremely difficult economic situation and therefore demanded increased assistance (see also 
Lipsky, 1980). Consequently, this increasing cross-pressure sparked an atmosphere of emergency 
and thus a mobilization of extra resources for solving these cases. This facilitated a large scale 
‘tidying up’ in many the municipalities where some of the affected clients were unravelled and 
moved to other benefit schemes and thus exempted them from the sanctions. As it was the job of 
social welfare workers to categorise their clients into the five matching groups, some women were 
also exempted from the requirements because their social welfare workers moved them to matching 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 “...it is generally unrealistic... to beat the weakest unemployed to find a job by reducing their relief from the state. 
The weakest groups have such limited qualifications and general abilities that it is extremely difficult to find suitable 
and willing employers for them. If the weakest social assistance recipients should receive real help, it demands a lot 
from the municipalities in terms of initiatives that tackles their integration into societies as well as increase the 
qualifications for their integration into the labour market. Otherwise, the result of the reduction will only be increasing 
poverty” (Arbejdsmarkedsudvalget, Udvalget for Udlændinge- og Integrations, 2005). 
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group five (Diop-Christensen, 2012). Therefore, as an extension of Hypothesis 1, I expect that 
being under threat (the ex-ante effect) increases the probability that social welfare workers would 
move  clients to other benefit schemes (Hypothesis 3).  
However, the ability of social welfare workers to make this group a priority could have 
depended on whether they could release extra resources. The introduction of the 300-hour rule had 
divided public and political opinion. In a heated public debate many left- and centre left-wing 
politicians railed against the use of strong economic incentives towards an already marginalised 
group. In some municipalities, the local government even decided that the administration should 
provide job guarantees for everyone (Diop-Christensen, 2012; Ankestyrelsen, 2007). It is therefore 
likely that the implementation of the 300-hour rule would receive more attention and also more 
resources in municipalities where the mayor belonged to the left- or centre left-wing parties. This 
would have enabled social welfare workers to provide extra job search assistance and therefore 
affect transitions to employment. However, it may also have facilitated the movement of clients to 
other benefit schemes (Hypothesis 4).  
Furthermore, concurrent with the introduction of the 300-hour rule, some municipalities 
received extra funds from the central government as part of the integration package ‘A New Chance 
for All’ (Ramboll, 2009). This was in order to improve services for integrating these long-term 
social assistance recipients into the labour market. In some municipalities, this resulted in a marked 
fall in the number of cases each social welfare worker had to manage (Diop-Christensen, 2012). 
The exact caseload of every social worker is likely to be an important predictor for their success or 
otherwise. It could therefore be expected that the effect of the 300-hour rule on the transitions to 
employment – as well as other benefit schemes – would be greater in municipalities that received 
the extra funds (Hypothesis 5).  
 
3. Data	  and	  methodology	  
3.1 Data	  
I use Danish individual level administrative data provided by Statistics Denmark combined with 
variables at municipality level. More specifically, I join the ‘Integrated Database for Labour Market 
Research (IDA)’ and the ‘DREAM database’. IDA contains information of more than 200 variables 
on the entire population living in Denmark on an annual basis (since 1980). This includes human 
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capital, demographic (e.g. country of origin, age, marital status, number of children) and 
employment characteristics (for a detailed English description see Timmermans, 2010). The 
DREAM database holds information on all public benefits for the entire population living in 
Denmark on a weekly basis (since 1991). Therefore, the combination of these two datasets includes 
detailed and weekly longitudinal information about the immigrant women who were covered by the 
300-hour rule. The latter feature makes this data particularly suitable for event history analysis.  
The period of analysis ranges from January 2006 to January 2008. I define the starting date 
as January 2006 because it allows me to observe unemployment transitions prior to the introduction 
of the policy. Concerning the end date, there was a ruling from the Appeals Board in the beginning 
of 2008, which changed the scope of the 300-hour rule (Ankestyrelsen, 2007).28 The choice of 
period implies that covered individuals were subject to the transition rules (150 hours during one 
year). In other words, they were required to work the equivalent of one month of full time 
employment.  
I focus on married women below 65 years of age who in 2006 had received social assistance 
for the previous 18 consecutive months, as these were the main conditions for the 300-hour rule. In 
greater detail, I construct a sample by calculating past benefit recipiency every month from the 1st 
of January to the 1st of November 2006. I delete Western immigrants from the sample along with 
the native Danish women as they are of marginal interest in the context of this study. Due to data 
limitations, I only allow for a single unemployment spell for every individual. In other words, if the 
person became employed, but lost the job after a few months and re-enters the social assistance 
scheme, only the first unemployment spell is included in the analysis. This is because the data does 
not provide information about whether the individual obtained 150 hours and when exactly she is 
required to work another 150/300 hours. Consequently, all consecutive spells along with those that 
are started prior to 1991 (left censored spells) are deleted. After deleting these cases, my sample 
consists of 5,564 individual spells of unemployment. 
I define three exit states from unemployment: Long-term employment (>3 months), short-
term employment (<=3 months), and other benefit schemes. The DREAM database does not 
contain direct information about employment prior to 2008, but I assume that individuals are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In the first instructions from the Ministry of Employment, the covered group was defined as married couples where 
one or both spouses received social assistance. After January 2008, only married couples in jobless households could be 
affected by the 300-hour rule. 
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working if they are not sanctioned or receive other government benefits.29 Following this 
assumption, I calculate the length of the following employment spell. Exits to 'other benefit 
schemes' include movement to disability pension, matching group 5 within the social assistance 
system, subsidised employment, paid education/training etc. Table 2 presents the final exit status 
for the sample. As evident from this table, 50 % are still unemployed at the end of the time period 
and thus right censored. These are women who worked in a part time job next to their social 
assistance for 150 hours. It also includes women who had an extension of their due date due to 
maternity leave, illness etc. About 17 % found a job that lasted longer than 3 months, while 13,5 % 
found a short-term job (less 3 months). More than 20 % were out of the social assistance scheme, 
but received other types of government benefits.  
 
Table 2: Final exit status (%) 
Unemployment with social assistance (right censored) 47,6 
Long-term employment (>3 months) 17,4 
Short-term employment (<=3 months)  13,5 
Other benefit schemes 21,5 
Total 100,0 
	  
 
The data does not contain direct information about whether an individual is subject to the 
300-hour rule. However, when defining the sample as described above, I can construct a dummy 
variable based on calendar information that indicates whether a person is supposed to have received 
the early warning from the municipality (threat of being sanctioned). Some of the municipalities did 
according to Ankestyrelsen (2007) not notify their clients on time. In order to account for this in the 
analysis, I use information from a telephone inquiry conducted in spring 2007 that identifies these 
municipalities. Only about 5 % of the women did not yet receive the early warning in January 2007. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 I argue that this is a valid assumption as employment is the only reasonable explanation for why an individual would 
leave the social assistance scheme keeping in mind that we observe those who are sanctioned due to the 300-hour rule 
as well as those that are moved to other schemes. 
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I also construct another dummy variable that indicates whether an individual was eventually 
sanctioned. This information is available in the DREAM database. In line with Ankestyrelsen 
(2007), 4,4 % of the covered women had been sanctioned at the end of the period (Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Descriptive of the data 
 Jan. 2006 Jan. 2006 Jan. 2006 
Age (%)    
Under 30 14,5 10,9 11,2 
30-40 48,2 48,6 47,9 
40-50 28,2 30,6 31,2 
50+ 9,1 10,0 9,7 
Origin (%)    
Yugoslavia 9,5 8,5 7,8 
Turkey 8,8 8,2 7,5 
Lebanon 12,3 12,9 14,1 
Iraq 21,5 22,7 24,0 
Afghanistan 10,6 11,0 9,9 
Somalia 8,0 8,7 8,9 
Other Middle East 16,5 17,0 18,1 
Rest of the world 12,8 11,0 9,8 
Children (%)    
None 25,5 27,3 26,4 
1-2 52,3 49,8 47,7 
3+ 22,3 22,9 25,9 
Highest educational level (%)    
Secondary school or less 51,0 52,0 52,1 
Technical and professional 35,7 34,6 34,3 
University 13,3 13,4 13,6 
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Unemployment duration in months 59,8 72,1 84,8 
300-hour rule (%)    
Threat 0,0 95,0 100,0 
Sanctioned 0,0 0,0 4,4 
Matching group (%)    
1-2 4,0 3,5 4,2 
3 38,4 36,1 30,4 
4 57,7 60,4 65,4 
Proportion receiving training/counselling (%)    
Less than 10 % 39,6 40,4 43,4 
10-40 % 14,3 14,0 12,1 
More than 40 % 15,0 15,2 15,4 
Missing 31,1 30,4 29,0 
Mayor’s partisan belonging (%)    
Left wing 71,2 71,6 72,0 
Right wing 26,5 26,5 26,1 
Local list 2,4 1,9 2,0 
Extra resources (%)    
Yes 56,9 59,5 61,7 
No 43,1 40,5 38,3 
Sample size 5564 4033 2619 
	  
 
Information about matching groups is available in the DREAM database. More than half of 
the women belonged to matching-category 4 (see also Bjerregaard Bach and Larsen, 2008). Very 
few were in matching-categories 1 or 2 (about 4 %). This suggests these women had very poor 
employment prospects. At the municipal level, I construct three variables using different data 
sources. Firstly, based on a survey conducted by Ankestyrelsen (2007), I construct a variable, which 
measures the proportion of covered clients that the municipality organised specialised trainings and 
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counselling for after sending out the notification letters in the autumn 2006. This variable is a proxy 
for whether the extra resources and work efforts of some municipalities influenced the outcomes of 
the 300-hour rule and thus if economic incentives work towards the weakest unemployed on a 
standalone basis. Secondly, I include information on whether the municipality had received any 
funds from the central government concurrent with the 300-hour rule (Rambøll, 2009). Thirdly, I 
also construct a variable indicating whether the mayor is from a left-wing party (Socialist People's 
Party, Social Democratic Party, Radical Left Party). As evident from Table 3, most of the women 
lived in municipalities that did not formally initiate extra trainings and counselling for the covered 
clients. As left-wing parties tend to be elected in larger urban centres, and this is also where most 
immigrants have settled, the majority of the sample lived in municipalities headed by a mayor from 
a left-wing party. About 60 % lived in one of the 15 municipalities that received extra funds from 
the central government concurrent with the 300-hour rule.  
The list of control variables includes human capital, demographic characteristics, duration 
dependency, regional unemployment rates, the municipality's size and framework conditions.30 As 
evident from Table 3, most women were middle-aged and had at least one child less than ten years 
of age. About 75 % originated from the Greater Middle East, while 10 % came from the former 
Yugoslavia. The majority had received only secondary school education – at best. Only about 13 % 
had a university degree.  
 
3.2 Methodology	  
I use an event-history model distinguishing between three competing risks: Long-term employment 
(>3 months), short-term employment (<=3 months), and other benefit schemes as defined above. 
Because some factors operate at the municipality level – as opposed solely to individual level – I 
employ a multilevel intercept model, where individuals are clustered within municipalities.  
Following Allison (1982), I apply this model by estimating a multinomial logit regression 
(see also Steele et al., 1999). The data is therefore reorganised into a person-month file, in which 
unemployment spells have been expanded so that every spell contributes with several lines – one 
for each time point t. The dependent variable takes the value 0 in every record except in the last 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The information about framework conditions is from Ankestyrelsen (2007) who ordered the municipalities according 
to their general conditions for integrating low-skilled immigrants into their local labour market. 
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time period, which indicated exit state k. For right-censored cases, the last time period also takes the 
value 0. Consequently, I can model the conditional probability that an individual i in municipality j 
makes the transition into state l in time point t given that she remained unemployed until time point, 
t – 1. This depends on duration dependency (lnt) and a vector of independent variables (Xijt). 
Duration dependency is defined as the log of the elapsed time spent in unemployment up until t. In 
principle, some women may have been unemployed since 1991 (180 months). Apart from 
demographic and municipality control variables (see Table 3), Xijt also includes sanctioning regime 
Tijt, if the individual is subject to a sanction Sijt, matching group Mijt, the proportion subject to 
special labour market initiatives in the municipality Iijt, the mayor’s partisan belonging Cijt and 
whether the municipality received extra resources Rijt. Consequently, I can express the conditional 
probability of an individual i in municipality j, to make a transition to competing risk, l, given that 
she has remained t – 1 months in unemployment and depending on Xijt, in the following way:  
 
 
 
where eijck and ujk represent the unobserved individual and municipality random effects assumed to 
be independent of observed characteristics, but associated with destination states. After testing both 
parametric and non-parametric techniques for modelling unobserved effects using the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) and in the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), I chose the latent class 
approach with two classes or support points to control for unobserved heterogeneity at individual 
level (Agresti, 2002; Vermunt, 2002). This approach is closely related to the strategy of Heckman 
and Singer (1982; 1984) (see Vermunt, 2002). 
In order to test whether the effect of the 300-hour rule depends on matching group (Mijt), the 
municipality’s use of support measures (Iijt), mayor’s partisan belonging (Cijt) and the resources of 
the municipality (Rijt) as specified in the hypothesis, these variables are interacted with threat Tijt 
and sanctioning Sijt. The models are estimated using Latent Gold software (Vermunt and Madgison, 
2005).  
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4. Empirical	  findings	  
4.1 Descriptive	  statistics	  
Figure 1 shows the cumulative hazard for the different exits. January 2006 to September 2006 is the 
period before the 300-hour rule was implemented. It is worth mentioning that the 300-hour rule was 
passed by the parliament in spring 2006. However, it is reassuring that we do not detect any 
anticipation effects from the immigrants on the likelihood of finding a job. This is probably because 
the public debate at the time was limited and most families did most likely not follow it because of 
insufficient integration into Danish society. From October 2006, the women would have begun 
receiving the notification letters from their local administration. The figures showing exits to short 
and long-term spells of employment indicate only minor increases in the job-finding rate. An 
exception is the quite dramatic increase in the hazard to short term employment towards the end of 
the period. This may suggest the 300-hour rule was having some effect, as many had their first due 
date extended because of illness or maternity leave. However, there was a marked increase in the 
transition to other benefit schemes starting from July 2006.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative hazards for different exits 
 
	  
 
 
4.2 Multivariate	  analysis	  	  
The next step involves analysing whether the probability of making these transitions has changed 
due to the 300-hour rule and if this effect varies according to matching group, the municipality's 
labour market integration initiatives, the mayor's partisan belonging and the resources of the 
municipality. I estimate three survival models (see Table 4). Model 1 is a simple model without any 
interaction terms; Model 2 presents results for the different matching groups and; Model 3 explores 
further whether municipality-level factors affected the outcome of the 300-hour rule. Characters in 
bold indicate a 5 % significance level and those in italic refer to a 10 % significance level.31  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Table 4 only presents the results from the main independent variables. Nevertheless, the estimation includes the 
control variables from Table 3. These estimates can be obtained upon request. 
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Table 4: Results for the competing risk duration analysis* 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Empl.>3 Empl.<=3 Other ben. Empl.>3 Empl.<=3 Other ben. Empl.>3 Empl.<=3 Other ben. 
Intercept          
Class 1 -3,330 
(0,348) 
-8,699 
(12,450) 
-4,936 
(0,353) 
-3,353 
(0,350) 
-10,532 
(16,254) 
-5,165 
(0,359) 
-3,388 
(0,360) 
-9,228 
(16,480) 
-5,580 
(0,399) 
Class 2 -10,699 
(14,403) 
-2,802 
(0,398) 
-8,787 
(2,090) 
-9,771 
(14,036) 
-2,795 
(0,399) 
-11,266 
(1,888) 
-6,388 
(2,456) 
-2,899 
(0,444) 
-8,335 
(1,088) 
300-hour rule 
Threat 0,218 
(0,077) 
0,077 
(0,084) 
1,345 
(0,080) 
0,261 
(0,118) 
-0,028 
(0,120) 
1,633 
(0,093) 
0,059 
(0,173) 
0,232 
(0,198) 
1,508 
(0,215) 
Sanctioned 0,843 
(0,258) 
1,983 
(0,215) 
-0,512 
(0,398) 
0,880 
(0,256) 
1,974 
(0,205) 
-0,439 
(0,400) 
0,869 
(0,253) 
2,046 
(0,212) 
-0,563 
(0,395) 
Matching group 
1-2 1,491 
(0,123) 
2,016 
(0,145) 
-0,645 
(0,199) 
1,599 
(0,157) 
2,173 
(0,184) 
0,181 
(0,284) 
1,503 
(0,123) 
2,047 
(0,148) 
-0,611 
(0,198) 
3 0,925 
(0,080) 
0,457 
(0,091) 
-0,932 
(0,087) 
0,931 
(0,110) 
0,274 
(0,137) 
-0,158 
(0,144) 
0,929 
(0,079) 
0,446 
(0,091) 
-0,890 
(0,086) 
4 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Match1-2Threat … … … -0,266 
(0,231) 
-0,255 
(0,245) 
-1,260 
(0,386) 
… … … 
Match3Threat … … … -0,041 
(0,146) 
0,333 
(0,170) 
-1,093 
(0,173) 
… … … 
Proportion subject to support measures 
Less than 10 % … … … … … … Ref. Ref. Ref. 
10-40 % … … … … … … -0,004 
(0,157) 
-0,446 
(0,218) 
1,046 
(0,224) 
More than 40 % … … … … … … -0,186 
(0,163) 
-0,536 
(0,206) 
1,265 
(0,206) 
Missing … … … … … … 0,002 
(0,130) 
-0,237 
(0,169) 
0,947 
(0,193) 
10-40 % Threat … … … … … … 0,166 
(0,203) 
0,433 
(0,243) 
-0,569 
(0,237) 
+ 40 % Threat … … … … … … -0,066 
(0,225) 
0,422 
(0,249) 
-1,024 
(0,229) 
MissingThreat … … … … … … 0,228 
(0,162) 
0,142 
(0,197) 
-0,643 
(0,201) 
Mayor’s party          
Left wing … … … … … … 0,012 
(0,120) 
-0,004 
(0,161) 
-0,318 
(0,147) 
Right wing … … … … … … Ref. Ref. Ref. 
LeftThreat … … … … … … 0,034 
(0,156) 
-0,182 
(0,182) 
0,360 
(0,165) 
Extra resources          
Yes … … … … … … -0,149 
(0,145) 
-0,061 
(0,181) 
-0,501 
(0,170) 
No … … … … … … Ref. Ref. Ref. 
YesThreat … … … … … … 0,135 
(0,141) 
-0,157 
(0,167) 
0,311 
(0,152 
* Apart from the variables presented in Table 3, the analysis also control for municipality size and unemployment rate 
at municipality level.  
 
4.2.1	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  300-­‐hour	  rule	  mainly passed through the social welfare workers 
The multivariate analysis corroborates the descriptive findings, namely that the 300-hour rule 
mainly resulted in transitions to other benefit schemes and thus the policy clearly affected social 
welfare workers (Hypothesis 3). In greater detail, clients at threat were more likely to be moved by 
their social welfare workers (Model 1). One could question whether the social welfare workers 
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moved their clients without a valid reason to protect them from the sanctions or if professional 
considerations were guiding their actions. As the data does not contain direct information from 
interviews with social welfare workers, it is not possible to provide a detailed and comprehensive 
answer to this question. However, the fact that the effect of the 300-hour rule varies across different 
matching groups, indicates the actions of social welfare workers were somewhat justified (see 
Model 3). After the introduction of the 300-hour rule, mainly women from matching-group 4 were 
moved to other benefit schemes; while those from matching groups 1,2 or 3 were less affected. 
However, prior to autumn 2006, there were no difference between the matching groups in the 
probability of being deemed unavailable for work. The introduction of the 300-hour rule therefore 
appears to have changed the judgment and priorities of social welfare workers at least in terms of 
who should be transferred to other schemes. The fact that social welfare workers more frequently 
moved women from matching-group 4 suggests that – in their view – many of these women had 
been in the social assistance scheme even if they did not belong there. This is also in line with the 
findings of Diop-Christensen (2012) who reports that the interviewed social welfare workers 
(despite being anonymous) denied that their decisions were based on non-factual considerations.  
This effect on social welfare workers was particularly pronounced in municipalities headed 
by a left-wing mayor and which had received extra funds from the central government – as also 
expected from hypothesis 4 and 5. In line with Lipsky (1980), this indicates that the resources at 
hand and pressure from the political leadership are important factors, when social welfare workers 
prioritise their job tasks and make decisions (see also Winter, 2005). Nevertheless, it appears that 
left-wing municipalities and those, which had received extra funds, were behind with these job 
tasks – or in Lipsky's terminology, they had used more coping-behaviour in the past (see also 
Lipsky, 1980).  
I also find evidence that municipalities, which in the wake of the 300-hour rule offered extra 
support in terms of counselling, training and internships, improved the overall outcome of the 
policy. The results even indicate that the 300-hour rule mainly had the expected positive effect on 
transitions to employment in municipalities, which provided such extensive support measures to the 
affected women (Model 3). Even though this appears only to pertain to transitions to short-term 
employment, these findings suggest that a comprehensive effort, which includes focused 
counselling and the relevant training/internships is a precondition for labour market integration of 
such marginalised immigrant women. Possibly, this variable should be viewed as a reflection of the 
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overall integration strategy of a municipality, as immigrants in municipalities with extended support 
measures were also less likely to be moved to other benefit schemes.  
In summary, the results show that the impact of the 300-hour rule was highly dependent on 
the actions of social welfare workers. In particular, the threat effect on transitions to other benefit 
schemes provides undisputed evidence of such an unexpected mechanism. This is supported by the 
results from the municipality level variables (the municipality's labour market integration 
initiatives, mayor's partisan belonging and the resources of the municipality). However, it is crucial 
to mention certain reservations related to these macro-level variables. In greater detail, even if 
different control variables have been included at municipality level (municipality size, 
unemployment rate and framework conditions), it is impossible to completely rule out potential 
spurious effects of other variables, which could be correlated with the municipality's labour market 
integration initiatives, mayor's partisan belonging, and the resources of the municipality (e.g. 
employment structure). 
 
4.2.2	  The	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  policy	  on	  the	  immigrant	  women	  
The strong economic incentives also influenced the unemployed immigrants – even if the extra 
efforts by social welfare workers appear to have been a necessary precondition. Model 1 indicates 
that being at threat increased transitions to employment spells that were longer than three months, 
but, perhaps surprisingly, not to short-term spells. These findings are somewhat contradictory to 
Hypothesis 1. However, the ex-ante effect on short-term spells may be 'hidden', as many probably 
worked a few hours during the week while still receiving social assistance and thus we would not 
observe these jobs in the data (see also Diop-Christensen, 2012). Furthermore, it is important to 
mention that the ex-ante effect in this case may have been reduced due to communication problems 
during the implementation phase (see Bjerregaard Bach and Larsen, 2008). Possibly, the most 
integrated women were both more likely to have understood the content of the letter from the 
municipality and to have obtained employment of longer duration, while the ‘weakest’ may not 
have understood the letter and thus did not react (see also Diop-Christensen, 2012).  
Regarding the ex-post effect, the impact of the actual sanction appears to be larger than the 
threat of sanction. In other words, the ‘stick’ approach seems to foster labour market integration 
even for this weak group of unemployed social assistance recipients. However, this effect is more 
105	  
	  
pronounced for transitions to short-term employment, suggesting that the sanctioned women either 
consciously decided to work only the requested hours or because employment barriers prevented 
them from forming a real attachment to the labour market. The fact that only around 5 % of the 
covered social assistance recipients were sanctioned in the end – partly because many had been 
moved to other benefit schemes – and that sanctions mainly stimulated transitions to short-term 
jobs, imply that the economic value of the actual sanction is limited. It is of course possible to 
imagine that these short-term jobs could act as stepping-stones to a more permanent integration into 
the Danish labour market, but this is outside the scope of the current study.  
Even though individuals from lower matching groups are generally more likely to have 
found a job than those from matching-group 4, I only find weak evidence that the effect of the 
economic incentives differs between these groups as anticipated from Hypothesis 2 (see Model 2). 
In greater detail, the impact of being at threat is similar for matching groups 1 and 2 as it is for 4. 
For matching group 3, on the other hand, being under threat does not only increase transitions to 
long-term employment, but also short-term jobs (significant at a 10 % level only). One explanation 
for this could be that those under threat in matching groups 1 and 2 were better able to find ‘long-
term’ jobs on their own. Regarding the ‘weakest’ (matching-group 4), social welfare workers were 
probably more inclined to put in an extra effort to help them find a job, which may have resulted in 
a better job match. This is also in line with Diop-Christensen (2012). Women in matching-group 3 
may, however, have received less support from their social welfare workers because they believed 
this group had more resources than matching-group 4. At the same time, individuals from 
matching-group 3 probably faced more severe employment barriers than those in matching groups 1 
and 2. The interaction effect between matching group and sanction was not statistically significant 
and it deteriorated the fit of the model. As a result, it was not included in the final Model 2. 
  
5. Conclusion	  
The aim of this study was to examine the impact of the Danish 300-hour rule – a policy that 
introduced a strict monitoring regime combined with a complete removal of social assistance for 
non-compliers – on transitions from unemployment to long-term employment, short-term jobs and 
other benefit schemes. The intention from the government was to 'make work pay' for non-Western 
immigrant women in receipt of long-term social assistance.   
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According to the descriptive statistics only around 4 % of the covered immigrant women 
were subject to the new sanctions. The reason for the few non-compliers is mainly related to the 
impact of the policy on the social welfare workers. In greater detail, the results suggests the 300-
hour rule changed their evaluation patterns in terms of who should be moved to other benefit 
schemes – particularly for clients in matching-group 4 and in municipalities headed by a left-wing 
mayor and which had received additional funding.  
The effect of the increased economic incentives on the immigrant women themselves was 
secondary, but largely confirming the expectations arising from job search theory. In other words, 
being at threat of losing access to social assistance (ex-ante effect) increased transitions to long-
term employment. However, this positive effect on transitions to employment depended on the 
increased support of social welfare workers. In other words, the economic sanctions did not work 
on their own for this group on the very margin of the Danish labour market. Regarding the impact 
of the actual sanctions (ex-post effect), it stimulated transitions to employment, especially to short-
term jobs. The effect of the actual sanction was considerably larger than the threat of losing benefit 
entitlements. Thus, the effect of the increased economic incentives were not neutralised by 
employment barriers even for this weak group. However, it remains unclear whether the effects of 
sanctions were short-term.  
The results of this study should remind researchers and policy makers that mechanisms 
other than those stated by job search theory should be taken into consideration. Sometimes 
legislation is not implemented in the spirit intended by policy makers (principal-agent problem) or 
its design can affect the priorities of the street level bureaucrats. In this particular context, further 
resources, but also incentives for the social welfare workers to provide adequate support for these 
women earlier in their unemployment spell may be a more efficient solution. In this regard, we 
should bear in mind that only relatively few of the affected women found a job that lasted longer 
than three months, while the policy caused much stress to the women due to the employment 
barriers they faced. We should also remember that such severe sanctions have grave consequences 
for the families concerned; especially those with children (see also Diop-Christensen, 2012).  
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